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Abstract
We consider the allocation of capacity in a system in which rental equipment is accessed
by two classes of customers. We formulate the problem as a continuous-time analogue of the
one-shot allocation problems found in the more traditional literature on revenue management,
and we analyze a queueing control model that approximates its dynamics. Our investigation
yields three sets of results.
First, we use dynamic programming to characterize properties of optimal capacity alloca-
tion policies. We identify conditions under which “complete sharing” – in which both classes
of customer have unlimited access to the rental ﬂeet – is optimal.
Next, we develop a computationally eﬃcient “aggregate threshold” heuristic that is based
on a ﬂuid approximation of the original stochastic model. We obtain closed-form expressions
for the heuristic’s control parameters and show that the heuristic performs well in numer-
ical experiments. The closed-form expressions also show that, in the context of the ﬂuid
approximation, revenues are concave and increasing in the ﬂeet size.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of the ability to allocate capacity on optimal ﬂeet size.
We show that the optimal ﬂeet size under allocation policies may be lower, the same as,
or higher than that under complete sharing. As capacity costs increase, allocation policies
allow for larger relative ﬂeet sizes. Numerical results show that, even in cases in which dollar
proﬁts under complete sharing may be close to those under allocation policies, the capacity
reductions enabled by allocation schemes can help to lift proﬁt margins signiﬁcantly.
Keywords: Service Systems, Queueing Control, Stochastic Knapsack, Fluid Models.
1 Introduction
Rental businesses found in many sectors of the economy share some fundamental attributes.
The rental company invests in equipment for which there is a potential demand, and a stream
of customers patronizes the company, renting its equipment. After each rental, the equipment is
returned to the company, and rental durations are typically signiﬁcantly shorter than the life of
the equipment, so that each unit may be used repeatedly.
For those who manage rental businesses, important managerial decisions focus on matching
rental demand with the equipment supply. These decisions create a hierarchy of managerial
controls at the company’s disposal. Longer term, capital-investment decisions set the company’s
overall level of rental capacity and attempt to capture as much demand for rental services as
is (marginally) proﬁtable. While they provide for long-term matching between supply and de-
mand, ﬂeet sizing decisions may not be used to counterbalance short-term supply and demand
mismatches. On a tactical time scale, capacity allocation decisions may be needed to determine
which customers are served when rental capacity becomes scarce.
In this paper we consider a simple, stationary model of a rental problem in which capacity
must be rationed among two classes of arriving customers. We address both the lower-level,
allocation problem and the higher-level capacity sizing problems, with an emphasis on the former.
Our approach to the tactical allocation problem follows in the spirit of early formulations of
seat allocation problems in the airline yield-management literature. (For example, see Littlewood
(1972), Alstrup et al. (1986), and Belobaba (1989).) When should arriving customers of each of
the classes be allowed to rent equipment, and when would they be “closed out?”
Two common assumptions made in traditional revenue management models make them in-
adequate for our purposes, however: they assume that there exists a ﬁnite horizon over which
units of capacity can be sold and that each unit of capacity can be used only once. For example,
in aviation there are c seats on a ﬂight, and once they are sold or the plane takes oﬀ they are
not available for sale.
While hotel problems could (and perhaps should) in principle be formulated as rental prob-
lems, most academic literature only addresses the problem of allocating the rooms available
on a single night. (For example, see Rothstein (1974), Ladany (1977), Williams (1977), Liber-
man and Yechiali (1978), Bitran and Gilbert (1996).) An exception is the application of linear-
programming (LP) based “bid price” controls to hotel stays. (See Williamson (1992) and Weath-
erford (1995)). In this case, multiple nights are considered, but the problem is modeled as
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deterministic.
In rental businesses, however, the problem is most naturally treated as a problem in dynamic
and stochastic control. An arriving customer rents a unit, which becomes unavailable for the
length of the person’s rental. When the rental period ends, the unit becomes available again.
Over any short period of time, the numbers of arriving and departing customers may be uncertain,
and managers must develop eﬀective policies for controlling the rental of system capacity.
We view the allocation of rental capacity as a continuous time, inﬁnite horizon problem
in which arrivals of customers and durations of rentals are both uncertain. We formulate this
problem as one of admission control to a multiple-server loss system. We assume that, if admitted
into service, a customer pays a daily rental fee which depends on the class to which she belongs.
If the rental request is rejected then a class-dependent, lump-sum penalty is incurred. We show
that this capacity allocation problem can be reduced to a special case of the stochastic knapsack
problem introduced in the telecommunications literature (Ross and Tsang (1989)), one in which
arriving “objects” (demands) are all of size one.
We note that this formulation does not capture the use of prior information on rental duration.
In some contexts, such as truck-trailer leasing (the application that originally motivated this
paper) and storage-locker rentals, this information may not be available. In others, such a hotel
systems, customer-stated projections of expected duration are readily available and can be of
great value in improving the eﬀectiveness of capacity allocation decisions. Thus, our approach
has important limits.
Nevertheless, the simplicity of our approach allows us to make a number of contributions:
1. We demonstrate that the allocation problem with lump-sum penalties can be reduced to one
with no penalties by appropriately adjusting the values of the rental fees. The adjustment
factors are proportional to the penalty values and the service rates.
2. We characterize two conditions under which the complete sharing policy that is often used
in practice is optimal: the ﬁrst is in the “oﬀ-season,” when the overall demand for service
is low relative to capacity; the second is in the “peak season” of high demand, given that
diﬀerent customer classes are suﬃciently similar.
3. We analyze a ﬂuid approximation to the original system, and we derive closed-form expres-
sions that characterize the controls and the performance obtained when allocating capacity
using an “aggregate threshold” policy. These expressions allow us to eﬃciently calculate
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admission thresholds that appear to perform well in the original, stochastic model.
4. Closed-form expressions for the ﬂuid model also allow us to demonstrate the concavity of
the ﬂuid model’s revenues with respect to the ﬂeet size when the aggregate threshold policy
is used. This concavity is the essential property required for the eﬃcient solution of the
related, long-term problem of capacity sizing.
5. We show that, in the presence of capacity rationing, the optimal ﬂeet size can be either
higher or lower than that obtained when no rationing is employed. The relationship between
the two ﬂeet sizes varies systematically with the cost of capacity.
6. We present numerical experiments that highlight the potential beneﬁt of jointly optimizing
ﬂeet size and tactical controls. In particular, there appear to be cases in which the sub-
optimal use of complete sharing results in near-optimal dollar proﬁts. Even in these cases,
however, the return on in investment in capacity suﬀers signiﬁcantly.
More broadly, these numerical results complement our characterization of suﬃcient conditions
for the optimality of complete sharing policies. Complete sharing policies maximize physical
measures of system utilization. When complete sharing is optimal, this physical measure of
system utilization is a good proxy for economic utilization. When complete sharing is not optimal,
however, its use can degrade proﬁt margins and, by extension, economic measures of resource
eﬃciency, such as return on assets. In this case, physical and economic measures of eﬃciency do
not coincide.
Thus, within the context of the stationary problem developed in this paper, we are able to
characterize how the use of tactical controls aﬀects longer-term decisions regarding ﬂeet size, as
well as longer-term and economic eﬃciency. While a complete analysis of the problem, which
should account for seasonal changes in demand patterns, is beyond the scope of this paper, our
current results represent a promising ﬁrst step.
Finally, we note that our analysis and results complement that of two recent papers that
have independently considered the stochastic knapsack. Our analysis parallels that of Altman
et al. (2001), which uses dynamic programming techniques to study optimal capacity allocation
rules and develops and solves (numerically) a ﬂuid approximation to the problem. Our special
problem structure, however, allows us to more fully characterize properties of optimal and heuris-
tic admission controls. We are able to develop a number of additional useful structural results
concerning optimal policies and to develop precise, closed-form characterizations in the context
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of ﬂuid control. O¨rmeci et al. (2001) also uses dynamic programming techniques to develop
similar characterizations of structural properties of the optimal policy. It does not, however,
consider heuristic controls. Neither of these papers considers how the use of tactical controls
aﬀects longer-term ﬂeet-sizing decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formulate and ana-
lyze the capacity allocation problem and demonstrate how the problem with lump-sum penalties
can be reduced to one without penalties. We also discuss properties of optimal capacity allo-
cation policies and establish conditions for the optimality of the complete sharing policy. In
Section 3 we introduce a heuristic aggregate threshold policy based on a ﬂuid-model version of
our system, and we compare the performance of this heuristic to that of the optimal policy. In
Section 4, we investigate the interaction between capacity sizing and capacity allocation problems
and establish how optimal ﬂeet capacity changes in the presence of capacity rationing. We then
conclude with a discussion of the results and describe open issues and worthwhile extensions. All
proofs may be found in the Appendix.
2 The Capacity Allocation Problem
In this section we analyze the capacity allocation decision. We formulate it as a problem in the
control of queues, and we use dynamic programming techniques to investigate properties of the
optimal control policies.
2.1 Model Description
Consider a ﬂeet of c identical vehicles or pieces of rental equipment accessed by 2 customer
classes whose arrival processes are independent and Poisson with intensities λ1 and λ2. Let the
durations of their rentals be independent, exponentially distributed random variables of mean
µ−11 and µ
−1
2 . Suppose, further, that each arrival wishes to rent exactly one unit of capacity.
At each arrival epoch a system controller, such as the manager of the rental location, can
decide whether or not to admit an arriving customer for service – if one of the c units of capacity
is free – or to reject the arrival. Arrivals that are admitted to service are permitted to complete
the duration of their (randomly distributed) rental periods uninterrupted. Rejected customers
do not queue; they exit the system. Similarly, customers that arrive when all c units of capacity
are rented are lost.
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Rewards and penalties associated with the system state and action are as follows. Arrivals
that are admitted to service pay respective rental fees of $a1 and $a2 per unit of time. When
a customer’s rental request is denied – either due to the absence of available rental capacity
or because of the particular capacity allocation policy used – a lump-sum penalty of $π1 or
$π2 is incurred, depending on the customer’s class. (For more on rejection penalties and their
relationship to service-level constraints, please see Appendix A.)
The assumption that interarrival and service times are exponentially distributed implies that,
at times between these event epochs, the system evolves as a continuous time Markov chain. At
these times, the system state can be completely described by the numbers of class-1 and class-2
customers renting units. Furthermore, system control – in the form of acceptance or rejection
of an arriving customer – is exercised only at arrival epochs, and it is suﬃcient to consider only
the discrete-time process embedded at arrival and departure epochs when determining the form
of eﬀective system controls (see Chapter 11 in Puterman (1994)). That is, the system can be
modeled as a discrete time Markov Decision Process (MDP).
In Appendix B we formally deﬁne discounted and average-cost versions of this MDP. For
both cases, we also indicate why there exist stationary, deterministic policies that are optimal.
Therefore, we will only consider policies of this class. Furthermore, rather than directly analyze
the MDPs’ objective functions, we use well-known results concerning the convergence of the
value-iteration procedure to analyze the problems.
2.2 Value Iteration Formulation
We begin our deﬁnition of the value iteration procedure by “uniformizing” the system. (See
Lippman (1975) and Serfozo (1979).) Formally, we let Γ = λ1 + λ2 + cµ1 + cµ2 and, for the
discounted problem with a continuous-time discount rate of α, we uniformize the system at rate
α + Γ.
Without loss of generality, we can deﬁne the time unit so that α + Γ = 1. Thus, λi ≡ λiα+Γ
and µi ≡ µiα+Γ become, respectively, the probability that the next uniformized transition is a
type-i arrival or service completion. Similarly, ai ≡ aiα+Γ is the expected discounted revenue per
type-i rental until the time of the next uniformized transition.
Note that the uniformization rate includes the discount factor, α. In fact, it is well known
that discounting at rate α is equivalent to including a constant intensity at which the process
terminates, after which no more proﬁts will be earned. Thus, one may think of α as the per-
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period probability that the next transition is a terminating one. (For example, see Section 5.3
in Puterman [12].)
The rate also includes rental completions of “phantom” customers. For example, if the current
system state is (k1, k2), then the probability that one of (c − k1) phantom type-1 customers or
(c − k2) phantom type-2 customers completes a rental is (c − k1)µ1 + (c− k2)µ2. At the end of
such a phantom rental, the observed state remains the same, (k1, k2).
Given these uniformized system parameters, we deﬁne the value-iteration operator T as
Tf(k1, k2) = a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1H1[f(k1, k2)] + λ2H2[f(k1, k2)]
+ µ1k1f(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2f(k1, k2 − 1)
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)f(k1, k2). (1)
The heart of the procedure is carried out via the maximizations
H1[f(k1, k2)] =
{
max[f(k1, k2)− π1, f(k1 + 1, k2)] when k1 + k2 < c,
f(k1, k2)− π1 when k1 + k2 = c,
(2)
and
H2[f(k1, k2)] =
{
max[f(k1, k2)− π2, f(k1, k2 + 1)] when k1 + k2 < c,
f(k1, k2)− π2 when k1 + k2 = c,
(3)
which are speciﬁed for any function f deﬁned on the state space S = {(k1, k2) ∈ Z2 | k1 ≥ 0, k2 ≥
0, k1 + k2 ≤ c}.
Let v0(k1, k2) ≡ 0 represent an initial estimate of the optimal expected discounted proﬁt, and
vn represent the estimated value after n iterations of the value-iteration algorithm:
vn(k1, k2) = a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1H1[vn−1(k1, k2)] + λ2H2[vn−1(k1, k2)]
+ µ1k1vn−1(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2vn−1(k1, k2 − 1)
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)vn−1(k1, k2). (4)
Then the fact that
λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c < 1 (5)
for α > 0 ensures that T is a contraction operator and that {vn} converges to the optimal “value
function”
v(k1, k2) = a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1H1[v(k1, k2)] + λ2H2[v(k1, k2)]
+ µ1k1v(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2v(k1, k2 − 1)
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)v(k1, k2) , (6)
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whose value equals that of the MDP’s optimal objective function (see Porteus (1982)).
The ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of (6) represent the expected discounted revenue
earned until the next uniformized transition. The following four represent the probabilities and
associated proﬁts-to-go associated with system arrivals and service completions. The last term
represents the probability and proﬁt-to-go of a “phantom” rental completion. (Without loss of
generality, we omit the probability, α, and value, 0, associated with a terminating transition.)
If no rejection penalties are used (π1 = π2 = 0), then (6) directly reduces to the stochastic
knapsack problem, well known from the telecommunications literature (Ross and Tsang (1989)).
Furthermore, for any given rental fees and penalty values (a1, a2, π1, π2), there exists an equivalent
stochastic knapsack formulation with adjusted rental fees: (â1, â2, 0, 0).
Theorem 1
For any problem with rewards and penalties (a1, a2, π1, π2), and optimal value function v(k1, k2),
there exists an alternative formulation with rewards
âi = ai + πi (µi + α) i = 1, 2 , (7)
zero penalties, and optimal value function v̂(k1, k2) for which
v̂(k1, k2) = v(k1, k2) +
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
+ π1k1 + π2k2. (8)
Furthermore, a policy is optimal for the original problem if and only if it is optimal for the
transformed problem with adjusted revenues and zero penalties.
Therefore, in the analysis that follows we will consider only the transformed problem v̂n(k1, k2)
with adjusted fees (â1, â2). Observe that the adjustment factors are linear in the penalty values
and the service rates.
We note that the paper’s numerical results are performed using an average-cost MDP formu-
lation. (Because they do not depend on the starting state, “average-cost” results are easier than
discounted results to interpret.) In this case, a similar result holds, with
âi = ai + µiπi, i = 1, 2 . (9)
For a formal development of the value iteration procedure and the analogue of Theorem 1 for
the average cost problem, please see Appendix C.
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2.3 Optimality of switching-curve policies
To establish structural properties of the optimal control policy, it is suﬃcient to show that
certain properties of the functions deﬁned on S are preserved under the action of the value
iteration operator, T (see Porteus (1982)). In particular, we are interested in submodularity. We
say that f(k1, k2) is submodular in k1 and k2 if
f(k1 + 1, k2 + 1)− f(k1, k2 + 1) ≤ f(k1 + 1, k2)− f(k1, k2), k1 + k2 + 2 ≤ c . (10)
Let F be the set of all f deﬁned on S that are submodular in k1 and k2.
The following Theorem states that F is closed under T , so that the value iteration operator
preserves submodularity of the value function. This, in turn, implies that the optimal capacity
allocation policy is of a special form; it is a “switching curve” policy.
Theorem 2 (Altman et al. (2001); O¨rmeci et al. (2001); Savin (2001))
a) f ∈ F ⇒ Tf ∈ F , and therefore v̂(k1, k2) ∈ F
b) In turn, for each k1 it is optimal to admit customers of class 1 when in state (k1, k2) if
and only if k2 < kmin2 (k1), where
kmin2 (k1) =
{
c− k1, if v̂(k1 + 1, c− k1 − 1) > v̂(k1, c− k1 − 1)
min(k2 : 0 ≤ k2 ≤ c− k1 − 1, v̂(k1 + 1, k2) ≤ v̂(k1, k2)), otherwise.
Similarly, for each k2 it is optimal to admit customers of class 2 when in state (k1, k2) if and
only if k1 < kmin1 (k2), where
kmin1 (k2) =
{
c− k2, if v̂(c− k2 − 1, k2 + 1) > v̂(c− k2 − 1, k2)
min (k1 : 0 ≤ k1 ≤ c− k2 − 1, v̂(k1, k2 + 1) ≤ v̂(k1, k2)) , otherwise.
Part b) of the Theorem can be interpreted as follows: when a given number of customers of a
particular class is already renting equipment, the “next” customer of the same class is admitted
if and only if the number of customers of the other class present in the system does not exceed
some critical value. This is switching curve policy, characterized by c critical indices for each of
the customer classes.
For the average cost case we can develop analogous results. At every pass of the value iteration
procedure, the operator preserves the submodularity of the estimate of the value function. This
ensures that the results of Theorem 2 apply to the optimal control policy for this case as well.
As an illustration of the optimal capacity allocation policies we consider an example with
â1 = 10, â2 = 5, λ1 = 25, λ2 = 10, µ1 = 5, µ2 = 1, c = 10 for the case when average revenue per
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period is maximized. Figure 1 describes the capacity allocation decisions for class 2 customers
and illustrates the notion of the “switching curve.”
Figure 1: The optimal capacity allocation policy for class 2 customers when the average adjusted
revenue per period is maximized (â1 = 10, â2 = 5, λ1 = 25, λ2 = 10, µ1 = 5, µ2 = 1, c = 10).
One feature of this example worth noting is the following: class 1 customers are always
allowed to rent equipment, i.e., kmin2 (k1) = c − k1 for all feasible k1 (and so we did not include
the graph of optimal allocation for class 1). In this case, we say that class 1 customers are a
preferred class. While in every numerical example we tested there existed a preferred class, we
have not been able to prove that such a class exists universally. Nevertheless, we have been able
to characterize a great deal about preferred customer classes.
2.4 Preferred classes and the optimality of the complete sharing policy
In this section we investigate the conditions which make a particular customer class a preferred
one. Closely connected to the question about the nature of preferred classes is the issue of
the optimality of the complete sharing policy: complete sharing is optimal when both customer
classes are preferred. The following theorem provides suﬃcient conditions under which one – or
both – classes may be preferred.
Theorem 3
a) Define λ = λ1 + λ2, µ = min (µ1, µ2) , a = max(â1, â2) and
c∗i = 2 +
λ
µ
(
a
âi
(
µi + α
µi
(
6 + 4
(
λ + 2µ
µi
))
+
µi
µ + α
(
2 +
λ + 2µ
µi + α
))
− 1
)
, i = 1, 2. (11)
Then for systems with capacity c > c∗i ,is always optimal to admit class i customers, i = 1, 2.
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b) In turn, for c ≥ max (c∗1, c∗2) the policy of complete sharing of the service fleet is optimal.
Theorem 3 provides a lower bound on the amount of capacity suﬃcient to ensure that a
particular customer class (or both classes) has unrestricted access to the available equipment.
Of course, for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, capacity costs may prevent c from becoming large enough
to optimally operate in the complete-sharing regime. In Section 4 we investigate the interaction
among capacity cost, ﬂeet size, and tactical control in more detail.
We note that for each customer class this lower bound is, as expected, a non-increasing
function of the penalty-adjusted fee paid by customers of this class. We observe that in the
simple case of µ1 = µ2  α, (11) implies that c∗1, c∗2  λ/µ. Thus, in the presence of seasonal
demand patterns, these results describe the “oﬀ-peak” season when the demand for rentals may
be signiﬁcantly lower than the available capacity.
Note that Theorem 3 is stronger than a limiting statement. In general, it is not hard to
imagine that as c → +∞, a complete sharing policy will be asymptotically optimal. Theorem
3, however, says that there is a ﬁxed, ﬁnite c above which complete sharing is optimal. This is
because, as more and more pieces of equipment are rented, the probability that the next event
is a service completion, rather than an arrival, grows. Thus, the busier the system, the stronger
its drift toward emptying out. For large enough c the expected loss of revenue due to blocking
becomes small when compared to the immediate gain of taking the next customer, no matter
which class she belongs to.
Theorem 3 states that for suﬃciently high service capacity the complete sharing policy is
optimal. It is also possible to show that the complete sharing is optimal even in the “peak
season”, when capacity is tight, provided that the customer classes are similar in terms of their
penalty-adjusted rental fees:
Theorem 4
For either class i ∈ {1, 2}, and j 	= i, if
âi
max[µi, µj ]
≥ λj
λj + µi
âj
µj
, (12)
then it is always optimal to admit type i customers.
The statement of Theorem 4 is intuitively appealing: all other parameters of the problem
being ﬁxed, there exists a minimum value of the adjusted rental fee âi which ensures that cus-
tomers of this class should be freely admitted into the system. Complete sharing of service ﬂeet
is optimal when (12) is satisﬁed for both classes, i.e. when â1 and â2 are “close”.
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Furthermore, recall that âi = ai + πi (µi + α) depends on both the revenue earned when
accepting a class i customer and the penalty paid when rejecting class i demand. That is, a
preferred customer may be proﬁtable to serve, unproﬁtable not to serve, or some combination
of the two. For example, a high-volume customer, such as a national account, may receive a
favorable rental rate in return for a large stream of rentals. At the same time, contractual
service-level requirements or the customer’s market power may imply a large rejection penalty,
so that class i arrivals become VIP. (For more on the relationship between service-level constraints
and rejection penalties, see Appendix A.)
The suﬃcient conditions of Theorem 4 are direct analogues to expressions for protection levels
in airline seat allocation models. (For example, see Belobaba (1989).) Both sets of inequalities
can be interpreted in terms of simple marginal analysis. For instance, for i = 1, the right hand
side of (12) describes (a bound on) the expected cost of admitting an arriving class 1 customer.
It is the expected revenue lost from a blocked class 2 customer that might have been served.
Here λ2λ2+µ1 is the probability that a class 2 arrives before the admitted class 1 ﬁnishes service,
and â2µ2 is the expected revenue lost, given the blocking occurs.
In fact, O¨rmeci et al. (2001) develops a characterization of preferred classes that mirrors
this “marginal analysis” result. The left hand side of (12) is more complex – and more stringent
– than simply â1µ1 , however. This diﬀerence better reﬂects the more complex dynamics of our
system.
Observe that there exists a broad range of circumstances under which a class of customers may
be preferred. First, note that if âi > âj and âi/µi ≥ âj/µj , then type-i customers have higher
penalty-adjusted rental rates and higher expected rental durations – and they are preferred.
Second, even though âj/µj ≤ âi/µi, type-j customers may also be preferred, as long as âj is not
too far below âi.
Conversely, it is possible to construct examples in which neither of the suﬃcient conditions of
Theorem 4 is satisﬁed. This occurs when âi > âj, µi > µj , and âi/µi < âj/µj . Of course, failure
to satisfy the suﬃcient conditions does not demonstrate that there exists no preferred class.
Finally, we note that the conditions of Theorem 4 are broadly applicable in that they do
not depend on the service capacity, c, or on the intensity of arrivals of the customer class being
considered for admission. The required parameters are simple to estimate from observable data,
and the results are simple to interpret.
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3 Heuristic Capacity Allocation Policies
In general, it is optimal to base the control of admissions into the service on the numbers of
customers of both classes 1 and 2 that are in the system at the time each control decision is
made. In practice, however, these “vector” policies may be diﬃcult to implement, especially for
rental systems with large capacities.
Admission control decisions that are based on the value of a particular scalar metric derived
from this vector state, rather than the detailed state of the system, may also provide eﬀective (if
suboptimal) controls. One of the most widely used heuristics is the aggregate threshold (trunk
reservation) policy.
The aggregate threshold (AT) policy assumes that there exists a preferred customer class,
and it is the class that oﬀers higher revenue per unit of time. The AT policy admits second-class
customers as long as the total number of customers already in the system does not exceed some
critical threshold value.
Besides being intuitively appealing, aggregate threshold policies have been proven to be
optimal whenever µ1 = µ2 (see Miller (1969)). More generally, we expect them to perform well
in cases when the expected service times for diﬀerent customer classes are similar.
Figure 2 illustrates the best AT policy, as well as the optimal control policy, for the same
example shown in Figure 1. While the control exercised by the AT policy diﬀers from that of the
optimal policy, the revenues it generates are nearly optimal, falling below optimality by about
0.15%.
Figure 2: The optimal and the best AT policies for class 2 customers (â1 = 10, â2 = 5, λ1 =
25, λ2 = 10, µ1 = 5, µ2 = 1, c = 10).
AT policies, however, do not yield closed-form expressions for system performance measures.
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In general, the task of computing the value of the best aggregate threshold level can be compa-
rable in its complexity to the task of computing the optimal control policy.
Ideally, we would like to have a policy that combines ease of calculation with the robust
performance of AT controls. In the following section we develop such a heuristic. It uses a ﬂuid-
model approximation of the stochastic model to derive closed-form expressions for the aggregate
threshold values.
3.1 Fluid models and scaling
In many practical situations, both the size of rental ﬂeet c and the oﬀered rental intensities
ρ1 = λ1µ1 and ρ2 =
λ2
µ2
are large. Under these conditions a deterministic ﬂuid model may oﬀer
a good approximation to the original control problem. Indeed, Altman et al. (2001) oﬀer a
heuristic derivation of such a ﬂuid model as the limit of a linearly scaled sequence of MDPs, and
they numerically evaluate the resulting Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equations.
We follow the approach of Altman et al. (2001), but given the underlying structure of our
problem, in which there are two classes of customers, we can directly analyze the trajectory of
the ﬂuid system. This allows us to develop an aggregate threshold heuristic whose performance is
robust and whose closed-form expressions allow for immediate calculation of policy parameters.
Furthermore, our analysis also allows us to demonstrate the concavity of discounted revenues
(of a “µ-scaled” version of our model), with respect to the ﬂeet size, c, a property that becomes
important in the capacity-sizing analysis of Section 4.
We start by deﬁning the state space and dynamics for ﬂuid approximations (in general).
Time t is continuous, and the state parameters k1(t) and k2(t) of the original model become
continuous state variables, restricted to set Sf = (k1(t) ≥ 0, k2(t) ≥ 0, k1(t)+ k2(t) ≤ c). Poisson
customer arrivals are replaced by the deterministic continuous “ﬂow” arrivals with intensities λ1
and λ2. The departure process becomes deterministic as well: for the state (k1(t), k2(t)) it is
represented by an outﬂow at rate µ1k1(t) + µ2k2(t).
Arrivals are controlled as follows: at time t, a control policy (u1(t), u2(t)) results in the total
customer inﬂow of u1(t)λ1+u2(t)λ2. Thus, for the control trajectories (u1(t), u2(t)) (0 ≤ ui(t) ≤
1, i = 1, 2) the Kolmogorov evolution equations for the original system are replaced by
dk1(t)
dt
= u1(t)λ1 − µ1k1(t) and dk2(t)
dt
= u2(t)λ2 − µ2k2(t), (13)
13
with a constraint that reﬂects the ﬁnite size of the service ﬂeet
λ1u1(t) + λ2u2(t) ≤ µ1k1(t) + µ2k2(t), i = 1, 2, whenever k1(t) + k2(t) = c. (14)
The total discounted revenue is then the objective to be maximized. If at t = 0 the system is
in the state (k1, k2), then – for a feasible (under (14)) control policy ∆ which uses (u1(t), u2(t))
– the total discounted revenue is
Rˆα(k1, k2,∆) =
∫ ∞
0
(â1k1(t) + â2k2(t)) e−αtdt =
â1k1
µ1 + α
+
â2k2
µ2 + α
+ Rα(k1, k2,∆), (15)
where
Rα(k1, k2,∆) =
∫ ∞
0
(
â1λ1u1(t)
µ1 + α
+
â2λ2u2(t)
µ2 + α
)
e−αtdt, (16)
is the part of the revenue that actually depends on the control policy chosen. In what follows,
the term “revenue” is used to designate Rα(k1, k2,∆).
Our aggregate threshold heuristic is based on a “scaled” version of the ﬂuid model:
Definition 1
A µ-scaled version of the fluid model with parameters λ1, λ2, µ1, and µ2 is the problem with
parameters λs1 =
λ1µ
µ1
, λs2 =
λ2µ
µ2
, µs1 = µ
s
2 = µ for µ ∈ [µ1, µ2].
Note that in every µ-scaled version of the ﬂuid model, the departure rates of both customer classes
are equal and λ
s
1
µs1
= λ1µ1 ,
λs2
µs2
= λ2µ2 . Since the departure rates of both classes are the same, one
can use arguments similar to those in Miller (1969) to show that the optimal admission control
decisions only depend on the total number of customers k(t) = k1(t)+k2(t) in the system. Thus,
given â1 > â2, a control policy which admits as many class 1 customers as possible and limits
the admissions of class 2 customers is optimal for any µ-scaled problem.
3.2 Fluid aggregate threshold heuristic
In the µ-scaled model, system dynamics simplify to
dk(t)
dt
= u1(t)λs1 + u2(t)λ
s
2 − µk(t) . (17)
In turn, a ﬂuid analog of the original, stochastic system’s AT policy admits class-2 customers
if and only if the total system occupancy, k(t), does not exceed a “ﬂuid aggregate threshold”
(FAT), kFAT. When ρ1 ≥ c or ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ c such a FAT policy is a direct analog of AT policies
in the original, stochastic system. For ρ1 < c < ρ1 + ρ2, however, there does not exist a neat
correspondence. Therefore, in the following sections we deﬁne and analyze the FAT policy within
each subset of the relevant parameter range.
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3.2.1 The FAT policy when ρ1 ≥ c.
For systems with ρ1 ≥ c class-1 traﬃc alone is suﬃcient to ensure complete utilization of the
rental ﬂeet, and a threshold policy can be deﬁned and analyzed in a straightforward fashion. In
this case, the control (u1(t), u2(t)) is deﬁned as follows:
(u1(t), u2(t)) =

(1, 1), for k(t) < kFAT,
(1, 0), for kFAT ≤ k(t) < c,(
cµ
λs1
, 0
)
, for k(t) = c.
(18)
Note that, once the system hits the boundary and k(t) = c, customers continue to be admitted
at the maximum feasible rate, and the system state remains at the boundary thereafter.
Control (18) then implies that, at time t, the revenue generation rate r(t) = â1λ
s
1u1(t)+â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ+α
for ρ1 ≥ c is given by
r(t | ρ1 ≥ c) =

â1λs1+â2λ
s
2
µ+α , for k(t) < kFAT,
â1λs1
µ+α , for kFAT ≤ k(t) < c,
â1µc
µ+α , for k(t) = c .
(19)
To compute the total discount revenues for a given kFAT, we must also account for the starting
state k ≡ k(0).
When k < kFAT ≤ c, there are three elements to the discounted revenues: those earned as
k(t) approaches kFAT; those earned when kFAT ≤ k(t) ≤ c; and those earned after the boundary
has been hit. We calculate each in turn. Let tFAT = 1µ ln
(
ρ1+ρ2−k
ρ1+ρ2−kFAT
)
be the time that system
state hits kFAT, so that k(tFAT) = kFAT. Then from (19) we have∫ tFAT
0
(
â1λ
s
1u1(t) + â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ + α
)
e−αtdt =
(
â1λ
s
1 + â2λ
s
2
µ + α
)
1− exp (−αtFAT)
α
. (20)
Similarly, let tc = tFAT + 1µ ln
(
ρ1+ρ2−kFAT
ρ1+ρ2−c
)
be the time at which the system state hits c, so that
k(tc) = c. Then using (19) we have∫ tc
tFAT
(
â1λ
s
1u1(t) + â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ + α
)
e−αtdt =
(
â1λ
s
1
µ + α
)
exp (−αtFAT)− exp (−αtc)
α
. (21)
Finally, from (19) the revenues earned after reaching the boundary are given by∫ +∞
tc
(
â1λ
s
1u1(t) + â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ + α
)
e−αtdt =
(
â1µc
µ + α
)
exp (−αtc)
α
. (22)
Collecting the revenue terms (20)-(22), substituting for tFAT and tc, and simplifying, we then
obtain the discounted revenues for the FAT policy when ρ1 ≥ c and k ≤ kFAT < c:
RFATα (k, kFAT | ρ1 ≥ c, k ≤ kFAT < c) =
µ
α(α + µ)
(
â1ρ1 + â2ρ2 −
(
ρ1 + ρ2 − kFAT
ρ1 + ρ2 − k
)α
µ
(
â2ρ2 + â1
(ρ1 − c)
α+µ
µ
(ρ1 − kFAT)
α
µ
))
. (23)
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When kFAT ≤ k < c, only type-1 customers are admitted to the system. In this case, in the
above analysis we replace tFAT by 0 and kFAT by k. Then analogous calculations yield
RFATα (k, kFAT | ρ1 ≥ c, kFAT ≤ k < c) =
µâ1
α(α + µ)
(
ρ1 − (ρ1 − c)
α+µ
µ
(ρ1 − k)
α
µ
)
. (24)
3.2.2 FAT policy when ρ1 + ρ2 < c
When ρ1 + ρ2 < c, a threshold policy with kFAT < c leads to incomplete utilization of the rental
ﬂeet and may trivially be improved by setting kFAT = c so that all customers are admitted for
service, no matter what the initial state of the system, k(0). Here, the policy is, again, a direct
analog of AT policies in the original, stochastic system. Speciﬁcally, the optimal ﬂuid-threshold
of c corresponds to complete sharing, an AT policy with a threshold of c.
Because ρ1 + ρ2 < c, even with no control the boundary k(t) = c is never hit (for t > 0). In
this case, the optimal control is
(u1(t), u2(t)) = (1, 1) ,
for any system state, k(t), and the rate at which revenue is earned is
r(t | ρ1 + ρ2 < c) = â1λ
s
1 + â2λ
s
2
µ + α
.
In turn, the revenue calculation is
RFATα (k, c | ρ1 + ρ2 < c)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
â1λ
s
1u1(t) + â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ + α
)
e−αtdt =
µ
α(µ + α)
(â1ρ1 + â2ρ2) . (25)
3.2.3 FAT policy when ρ1 < c ≤ ρ1 + ρ2.
Finally, when ρ1 < c ≤ ρ1 + ρ2 there does not appear to exist a ﬂuid analog of a threshold
policy that is both eﬀective and straightforward to implement. On the one hand, a threshold
of kFAT < c results in incomplete utilization of the rental ﬂeet and can be improved upon by
admitting some class-2 customers. On the other, setting kFAT = c and admitting all class-2
customers is infeasible, since the maximum rate at which the system can be cleared is strictly
less than the rate at which customers are arriving: cµ < λs1 + λ
s
2.
In this case, a natural interpretation of the threshold rule deﬁnes a “soft” threshold when
k(t) = c, one that limits, but does not eliminate, the ﬂow of class-2 customers into the system:
(u1(t), u2(t)) =
{
(1, 1), for k(t) < c,(
1, µc−λ
s
1
λs2
)
, for k(t) = c ,
(26)
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so that
r(t | ρ1 < c ≤ ρ1 + ρ2) =
{
â1λs1+â2λ
s
2
µ+α , for k(t) < c,
â1λs1+â2(µc−λs1)
µ+α , for k(t) = c.
(27)
Thus for ρ1 < c < ρ1 + ρ+2, the control generates system behavior and revenue that diﬀer from
those when kFAT < c or kFAT = c, and we denote this soft threshold as kFAT = c−.
Given kFAT = c− and any k ≡ k(0) ∈ [0, c], the system’s revenues can be split into two
components: those earned before reaching c, and those earned after. If tc = 1µ ln
(
ρ1+ρ2−k
ρ1+ρ2−c
)
is
the time required for the system to reach the boundary, than the ﬁrst revenue component in (27)
gives us ∫ tc
0
(
â1λ
s
1u1(t) + â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ + α
)
e−αtdt =
(
â1λ
s
1 + â2λ
s
2
µ + α
)
1− exp (−αtc)
α
. (28)
After the full capacity is reached, we use the bottom revenue generation rate within (27) to
obtain∫ +∞
tc
(
â1λ
s
1u1(t) + â2λ
s
2u2(t)
µ + α
)
e−αtdt =
(
â1λ
s
1 + â2(µc− λs1)
µ + α
)
exp (−αtc)
α
. (29)
Adding (28) and (29), and using the expression for tc, we then have
RFATα (k | ρ1 < c ≤ ρ1 + ρ2) =
µ
α (α + µ)
(
(â1ρ1 + â2ρ2)− â2 (ρ1 + ρ2 − c)
α
µ
+1
(ρ1 + ρ2 − k)
α
µ
)
. (30)
3.2.4 Optimal Thresholds and Revenues for the FAT Policy
We can use the expressions we have derived for discounted revenues to determine both opti-
mal thresholds and optimal discounted revenues. In both cases, we obtain simple, closed-form
expressions.
First we address the optimal threshold, k∗FAT. For ρ1 ≥ c, its determination follows from
diﬀerentiation of (23) with respect to kFAT:
Theorem 5
The optimal value of the aggregate threshold, k∗FAT, is independent of the starting state, k, and
is given by
k∗FAT(c) =

0, for c < ρ1
(
1−
(
â2
â1
) µ
µ+α
)
,
c− (ρ1 − c)
((
â1
â2
) µ
µ+α − 1
)
, for ρ1
(
1−
(
â2
â1
) µ
µ+α
)
≤ c ≤ ρ1,
c− for ρ1 < c ≤ ρ1 + ρ2,
c, for ρ1 + ρ1 < c .
(31)
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We observe that, all other problem parameters being ﬁxed, the optimal aggregate threshold
value described by (31) is a non-decreasing function of the ﬂeet size c. In particular, if the
available rental capacity falls below the critical value cmin = ρ1
(
1−
(
â2
â1
) µ
µ+α
)
, then it is optimal
not to admit any of class 2 customers into service. Conversely, if the rental capacity is suﬃciently
large, exceeding the oﬀered load from class 1, then the control on admissions of class 2 customers
should be postponed until the entire rental ﬂeet is utilized. For the rental ﬂeet values in between
these two critical quantities, some form of admission control on class 2 customers is optimal,
even in states in which some rental capacity is available. We observe that the critical index cmin
is a decreasing function of the ratio of penalty-adjusted rental fees â2/â1.
When the time discounting factor α is much smaller than µ, the optimal aggregate threshold
level, described in Theorem 5, is not particularly sensitive to the choice of µ. Even for rental
durations of several months, the service rates (inverse of the expected service time) are about
µ 
 10−3 per day and are at least order of magnitude higher than any realistic values for α (for
example, 30%− 40% annual discounting rate results in α 
 10−4 per day). The same argument
suggests that k∗FAT is not sensitive to the choice of α. Thus, it is straightforward to use k
∗
FAT as
a threshold for both discounted and “average-cost” versions of the problem.
Using expression for the optimal aggregate threshold (31), we obtain
Theorem 6
Given fixed λs1, λ
s
2, µ, â1, â2 and α, define cmin = ρ1
(
1−
(
â2
â1
) µ
µ+α
)
.
a) If the rental system starts in state k, then the optimal total discounted revenue is
RFATα (k, k∗FAT(c)) =
µ
α(α+µ)
(
â1ρ1 − â1 (ρ1−c)
α+µ
µ
(ρ1−k)
α
µ
)
, for c ≤ cmin,
µ
α(α+µ)
â1ρ1 + â2ρ2 − â2
(
ρ2+(ρ1−c)
(
â1
â2
) µ
µ+α
)α+µ
µ
(ρ1+ρ2−k)
α
µ
 , for cmin ≤ c < ρ1, k < k∗FAT(c),
µ
α(α+µ)
(
â1ρ1 − â1 (ρ1−c)
α+µ
µ
(ρ1−k)
α
µ
)
, for cmin ≤ c < ρ1, k ≥ k∗FAT(c),
µ
α(α+µ)
(
â1ρ1 + â2ρ2 − â2 (ρ1+ρ2−c)
α+µ
µ
(ρ1+ρ2−k)
α
µ
)
, for ρ1 ≤ c ≤ ρ1 + ρ2
µ
α(α+µ) (â1ρ1 + â2ρ2) , for ρ1 + ρ2 < c .
(32)
b) For fixed values of rental fees, demand and service parameters, RFATα (k, k∗FAT(c)) is an
non-decreasing concave function of the rental fleet size c for every k ≤ c.
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Inspection of (32) shows that RFATα (k, k
∗
FAT(c)), like k
∗
FAT(c), is insensitive to the choice of µ
for α µ. (Of course, this insensitivity follows from the µ-scaled problem, not necessarily from
the two-class problem in which µ1 	= µ2.) Part b) of Theorem 6 also states that, for any starting
state, FAT revenues are concave in c. Thus, although the concavity of revenue with respect to
ﬂeet size is diﬃcult to demonstrate in the context of the original MDP, it emerges naturally from
the µ-scaled ﬂuid approximation. This concavity property becomes important in the context of
ﬂeet sizing decisions, which we discuss in Section 4.
3.3 Numerical study of the performance of the FAT heuristic
Our motivation for developing the FAT heuristic was that it should perform well and be easy to
implement. Therefore, to test the policy’s performance we have undertaken a series of numerical
studies which compare its average revenues to those obtained using the optimal control and the
complete sharing policy.
In two of the three cases analyzed above, translation of the FAT policy (31) to the context of
a discrete, stochastic system is straightforward. For ρ1 ≥ c we assume µµ+α ≈ 1, when necessary,
and then round the resulting k∗FAT down to the nearest integer. For ρ1 + ρ2 < c, we set the
aggregate system threshold equal to c, eﬀectively implementing a complete sharing policy.
When ρ1 < c < ρ1 + ρ2, however, k∗FAT = c
−, and the inﬂow of class-2 rentals is partially
controlled. In this case, there is not a clear correspondence in a discrete system: setting the
aggregate threshold to c implements complete sharing, which does not control class-2 customers
at all; conversely, setting the threshold to c− 1 completely stops the ﬂow of class-2 customers at
the boundary.
Because both alternatives of the FAT policy are trivial to compute, we include them both in
our numerical tests. In total, in each numerical experiment, we test four polices: the optimal
policy; FAT with c− set to c (“c− = c”); FAT with c− set to c− 1 (“c− = c− 1”); and complete
sharing (CS). For each set of system parameters, we evaluate the Markov chains induced by the
four policies (in the case of the optimal policy, via value iteration) to calculate long-run average
revenues.
In our numerical tests, we ﬁx the expected rental duration of class-1 rentals at 1/µ1 = 1,
and we run sets of tests in which systematically vary the oﬀered load, θ = ρ1+ρ2c , as well as the
relative processing rate of class-2 customers, µ2. Within each test set, θ and µ2 also remain ﬁxed,
and we run (10× θ + 1) experiments in which we systematically vary λ1and λ2.
19
CS Policy FAT with c− = c− 1 FAT with c− = c
θ µ2
µ1
= 0.1 µ2
µ1
= 1 µ2
µ1
= 10 µ2
µ1
= 0.1 µ2
µ1
= 1 µ2
µ1
= 10 µ2
µ1
= 0.1 µ2
µ1
= 1 µ2
µ1
= 10
0.5 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
0.8 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.4) 1.5 (2.8) 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.4) 1.5 (2.8) 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.4) 1.5 (2.8)
1.0 0.3 (1.8) 0.9 (1.9) 1.0 (1.9) 0.3 (1.8) 0.9 (1.9) 1.0 (1.9) 0.3 (1.8) 0.9 (1.9) 1.0 (1.9)
1.5 3.1 (6.2) 4.1 (6.5) 6.7 (11.7) 1.2 (4.0) 0.7 (3.2) 0.2 (2.8) 1.9 (5.8) 2.8 (7.3) 4.3 (11.6)
2.0 7.0 (13.1) 6.3 (12.7) 9.6 (16.1) 1.5 (5.9) 0.6 (2.7) 0.3 (2.3) 2.7 (10.9) 3.3 (12.5) 4.7 (16.1)
2.5 9.2 (16.9) 9.6 (16.5) 11.6 (19.6) 1.6 (7.9) 0.7 (4.6) 0.2 (1.9) 3.1 (14.6) 3.5 (16.3) 4.6 (19.6)
3.0 10.9 (20.5) 11.3 (20.1) 12.3 (22.3) 1.6 (9.4) 0.7 (5.3) 0.2 (1.2) 3.5 (17.4) 3.6 (19.1) 4.2 (22.3)
Table 1: Numerical results. Average and maximum (in parentheses) percent shortfall from opti-
mal revenue for 10 θ + 1 test cases. Penalty-adjusted service fees are â1 = 10 and â2 = 5 for
class 1 and 2 customers, respectively. Service rate for class 1 customers is µ1 = 1. Rental fleet
size is c = 10.
More speciﬁcally, in each test set we begin with (10×θ+1) equally spaced λ1’s – from λ1 = 0 to
λ1 = µ1c – and then choose λ2 in each case so that λ1µ1c +
λ2
µ2c
= θ. We then modify the endpoints –
where either λ1 or λ2 equals zero – so that the arrival rate that would be zero actually equals 0.01.
For example, the set in which θ = 1 and µ2/µ1 = 1, there are 10×θ+1 = 11 test points, and their
(λ1, λ2) values are {(0.01, 9.99), (1, 9), (2, 8), (3, 7), (4, 6), (5, 5), (6, 4), (7, 3), (8, 2), (9, 1), (9.99, 0.01)}.
Table 1 shows results for the 21 sets of experiments. In each experiment within a set we
record average penalty-adjusted revenue per period using the optimal policy (R∗), as well as
that obtained from the FAT and CS policies (RFAT and RCS). For each experiment we then
calculate the percentage revenue lost when using the heuristic controls ((1 − RFAT/R∗) × 100%
and (1 − RCS/R∗) × 100%). Finally, within each cell of Table 1 we report two statistics that
summarize the results across all 10× θ+1 experiments: the average of the percentage shortfalls,
as well as the maximum shortfall recorded over all cases (in parentheses).
Table 1’s results show that all three policies perform well at low oﬀered loads. For θ ≤ 1,
none of the three policies controls the inﬂow of class-2 requests, and all three perform consistently
close to optimality. It is also worth noting that, in these examples, the CS policy is consistently
optimal at θ = 0.5. While the suﬃcient c∗i ’s of Theorem 3 can be very large – in the thousands
in many of these examples – the oﬀered loads at which the CS policy is actually optimal appear
to be much less extreme.
As θ climbs above 1, the three policies diverge, and the FAT heuristics outperform CS. At
θ = 2 – when the oﬀered load is twice that of the system’s capacity – the FAT with c− = c− 1
still performs quite well, with a worst optimality gap of less than 6% and an average gap in each
table cell that is consistently below 1%. Here, the performance of FAT with c− = c is noticeably
worse, with the maximum gap of 16.1% and an average gap ranging from 2.7% to 4.7%. The
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CS policy’s worst-case performance is also 16.1% below optimal, and its average performance in
each cell trails that of FAT with c− = c, falling 7.0% to 9.6% below optimality.
At very high θs, the FAT heuristic with c− = c − 1 consistently outperforms the other
heuristics. For example, when θ = 3, the average revenue generated by the FAT policy with
c− = c− 1 ranged from 0.2% to 1.9% below optimal, and the worst-case examples of each of the
10θ+1 test sets ranged from 1.2% to 9.4% below optimal. In contrast, average and worst-case
performance of the FAT with c− = c and CS policies were 3 to 4 times worse.
Thus, as the oﬀered load increases, the performance of all three heuristics deteriorates with
respect to optimality. In general, the heuristics are exercising insuﬃcient control of class-2
customers. The relatively strong performance of the FAT heuristic with “c−” set to c−1 reﬂects
the beneﬁt of reserving the last unit of rental capacity for “preferred” class-1 customers when
the traﬃc intensity is high.
Figure 3 provides additional detail on the how the setting of c− aﬀects the performance of
FAT heuristic. In the ﬁgure, rental capacity is c = 10, service rates are µ1 = 1.0 and µ2 = 0.1,
and penalty-adjusted revenues are â1 = 10 and â2 = 5. The aggregate oﬀered load is ﬁxed at
θ = ρ1+ρ2c = 2, and the x-axis of the ﬁgure’s parametric analysis tracks the fraction of the oﬀered
load due to class-1 customers as it is systematically increased from 0% to 100% of the total: from
ρ1/c = 0, to ρ1/c = 2. The y-axis reports the two FAT policies’ resulting percentage shortfall
from long-run average optimal revenue.
Figure 3: Performance of alternative FAT heuristics with c− interpreted as c (dashed line) and
as c− 1 (solid line). System has c = 10, θ = ρ1+ρ2c = 2, µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0.1, â1 = 10, and â2 = 5.
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As Fig. 3 indicates, whenever ρ1/c ≥ 1.0, the two policies are identical – with the same
threshold, kFAT ≤ c−1, and the same long-run average revenues. When ρ1/c < 1.0, however, the
two heuristics’ recommendations diﬀer – kFAT = c − 1 versus kFAT = c – and average revenues
diﬀer as well. For moderate ρ1’s, the “c− = c− 1” policy outperforms the “c− = c” one, and for
ρ1  c, the reverse is true.
It is worth noting that numerical experiments using other θs yield plots whose gross features
are directly analogous to those of Figure 3. Larger values of θ lead to more extreme performance
diﬀerences between the c− = c−1 and c− = c variants of the FAT at moderate to very low values
of ρ1.
4 The Eﬀect of Capacity Allocation on Optimal Fleet Size
The allocation policies investigated in Sections 2 and 3 are tactical controls intended to address
instances in which the number of rental units available falls short of the anticipated near-term
demand. The total ﬂeet size c clearly aﬀects the nature of the control. In particular, Theorem 3
shows that, given ample capacity, the optimal control is to give free access to all customers.
It is also natural to ask the converse question. How does the use of tactical control aﬀect the
ﬂeet size the rental company should use? When is the optimal ﬂeet size large enough so that, as
in Theorem 3, complete sharing is (nearly) optimal? More generally, given the ability to change
ﬂeet size, what is the economic value to a ﬁrm of exercising tactical controls? In this section we
address both of these questions.
In fact, the eﬀect of capacity allocation on optimal ﬂeet size is not immediately clear. One
might argue that, given any ﬁxed ﬂeet size, optimal rationing increases revenue per unit of time.
This revenue increase, in turn, allows the ﬁrm to more proﬁtably sustain higher overall capacity
levels. Alternatively, one might argue that rationing reduces the aggregate arrival rate to the
rental ﬂeet and that, in turn, fewer units of capacity are required to process the arrivals that are
actually served.
We can provide some insight into these trade-oﬀs by directly comparing the optimal ﬂeet
size under active allocation policies to that under complete sharing, which passively allows all
customers access to rental capacity whenever it is available. We formulate the problem of ﬁnding
the optimal ﬂeet size as
Π(∆) = max
c
(R (c,∆(c)) − hc) , (33)
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where R(c,∆(c)) is the average revenue per period when operating c units under allocation policy
∆(c) and the capacity cost of $h per unit per period is ﬁxed for all c. Note that, given a ﬁxed
oﬀered load, ρ1 + ρ2, the allocation policy, ∆(c), may vary with c.
We then compare the maximizer of (33) under two regimes. In one we use ∆(c) = CS(c), the
complete sharing policy, for all c. In the other ∆(c) = ∆∗(c), which we deﬁne as any family of
allocation policies for which the following attributes hold:
1. For any ﬁxed c, R (c,∆∗(c)) ≥ R (c, CS(c)).
2. There exists a c˜ <∞ such that for all c ≥ c˜, R (c,∆∗(c)) = R (c,CS(c)).
3. R (c,∆∗(c))−R (c− 1,∆∗(c− 1)) ≤ R (c− 1,∆∗(c− 1))−R (c− 2,∆∗(c− 2)).
Condition 1 states that, for any c, ∆∗(c) performs at least as well as complete sharing.
Condition 2 states that there exists a ﬁnite ﬂeet size above which complete sharing performs
as well as ∆∗(c). Note that Theorem 3 demonstrates that such a c˜ exists in the context of the
discounted problem.
Condition 3 requires that average revenues per period under ∆∗ are concave in c. Theorem
6 proves that this type of concavity exists for the FAT policy in the context of the discounted
ﬂuid model, and the result also suggests that the condition (roughly) holds for AT policies more
generally. Similarly, though we have not been able to prove that the condition holds for the
optimal policy, it has consistently been present in the numerical tests we have run.
Without loss of generality, we assume that â1 ≥ â2, and we deﬁne
h∗min = R (c˜,∆
∗(c˜))−R (c˜− 1,∆∗(c˜− 1)) ,
hCSmin = R (c˜,CS(c˜))−R (c˜− 1,CS(c˜− 1)) ,
h∗max = R (1,∆
∗(1)) −R (0,∆∗(0)) ≥ max
(
â1ρ1
1 + ρ1
,
â1ρ1 + â2ρ2
1 + ρ1 + ρ2
)
, and
hCSmax = R (1,CS(1)) −R (0,CS(0)) =
â1ρ1 + â2ρ2
1 + ρ1 + ρ2
. (34)
Observe that h∗min and h
CS
min are the marginal values of adding the last piece of equipment, as
it becomes optimal to take all arrivals, ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served. Similarly, h∗max and hCSmax are the
marginal values of the ﬁrst piece of equipment under the two schemes. It is not diﬃcult to see
that h∗min ≤ hCSmin ≤ hCSmax ≤ h∗max .
The following result uses these relationships to parameterize how the ﬂeet size under capacity
allocation policies diﬀers from that under complete sharing:
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Theorem 7
Let c∗(h) and cCS(h) be the maximizers of (33) under ∆∗ and CS.
a) If h < h∗min then c
∗(h) = cCS(h) ≥ c˜.
b) If h ∈ [h∗min, hCSmin] then c∗(h) ≤ cCS(h).
c) If h ∈ [hCSmin, hCSmax] then c∗(h) may be smaller, equal to, or larger than cCS(h).
d) If h ∈ [hCSmax, h∗max] then c∗(h) ≥ cCS(h).
e) If h > h∗max then c∗(h) = cCS(h) = 0.
We note that the results of Theorem 7 can be extended to the multi-class case, as well as to
multi-period capacity sizing models with more complex cost structures. We brieﬂy discuss the
latter in the discussion at the end of the paper.
Thus, the optimal ﬂeet size using capacity rationing may be either higher or lower than that
under the complete sharing policy. The theorem shows that the relationship between the two
depends fundamentally on the unit cost of capacity.
Parts (a) and (e) of the theorem show that optimal capacity levels for CS and ∆∗ coincide for
very high and very low values of holding costs. If holding costs are extremely high, the expected
revenues cannot justify the acquisition of even a single unit of capacity, even under rationing. On
the other hand, if the holding costs are extremely low, then Theorem 3 implies that the optimal
rationing policy is complete sharing, and in this case the proﬁt maximizing capacity levels of the
two policies again coincide.
Parts (b) and (d) show ranges for which the c∗(h) unambiguously dominates and is dominated
by cCS(h). Part (b) shows that for low values of h the lower marginal value to the rationing
policy of adding the “last” unit of capacity (before complete sharing becomes optimal) drives
c∗(h) below cCS(h). Part (d) shows that for high values of h the beneﬁt of being able to reject
lower revenue customers allows c∗(h) to climb above cCS(h).
Finally, part (c) deﬁnes a set of intermediate values of h for which c∗(h) can be higher, the
same as, or lower than cCS(h). The ordering of the relationships reﬂects the proximity of h to
the boundaries, hCSmin and h
CS
max.
While the relationships described in the theorem are not strict inequalities, it is not diﬃcult
to develop examples in which c∗(h) diﬀers from cCS(h). Figure 4 illustrates an example in which
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the ∆∗(c) used for each c is the optimal policy for that c. Given the problem parameters c˜ = 30,
h∗max = 9.09, hCSmax = 7.14, h∗min = 0.65, and h
CS
min = 0.63. Between h
CS
max and h∗min, optimal ﬂeet
sizes for the two policies are equal at h = 6.5.
Figure 4: Optimal capacity size as a function of the holding cost under the optimal and complete
sharing policies. Fixed problem parameters: â1 = 10, â2 = 5, λ1 = λ2 = 10, and µ1 = µ2 = 1.
Capacity cost per unit of time, h, is systematically varied.
We now turn to the economic beneﬁt of capacity rationing. Table 2 presents a set of 25
numerical experiments that compare the performance of the optimal (OPT) and complete sharing
(CS) policy. For each example, the table reports the optimal ﬂeet size, proﬁt per period, and
(percent) proﬁt margin for both policies. In all of the experiments, the aggregate arrival rate
(λ1 + λ2), service rates (µ1 and µ2), and penalty-adjusted revenues (â1 and â2) remain ﬁxed.
Then the fraction of the oﬀered load due to class-1 customers ( λ1λ1+λ2 ) and the holding cost per
unit of time per unit of capacity (h) are systematically varied. The table’s results reﬂect three
phenomena that are worth noting.
The ﬁrst is the eﬀect of increased holding costs on ﬂeet sizes, already displayed in Figure
4. At lower relative holding costs, capacity rationing reduces the optimal ﬂeet size relative to
that for complete sharing a company. As one looks down each pair of columns, however, one
sees that rationing allows a company to maintain larger capacity than would be optimal under
complete sharing. Interestingly, in looking across each row, one sees that for very small and very
large fractions of class-1 customers, optimal capacities from the two policies are the same. In the
former case, this is due to the optimality of complete sharing; the policies themselves coincide.
In the latter case, however, the optimal policy reserves capacity for class-1 customers. While
complete sharing is suboptimal, the blocking of class-1 customers due to class-2 admissions is
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λ1
λ1+λ2
= 0.1 λ1λ1+λ2 = 0.3
λ1
λ1+λ2
= 0.5 λ1λ1+λ2 = 0.7
λ1
λ1+λ2
= 0.9
h
â2
OPT CS OPT CS OPT CS OPT CS OPT CS
Fleet 0.5 11 11 12 13 12 13 13 13 14 14
Sizes 0.7 9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 12
0.9 5 5 6 8 8 9 9 10 11 11
1.1 0 0 3 4 6 7 8 9 9 10
1.3 0 0 2 0 4 3 6 6 8 8
Proﬁts 0.5 18.52 18.52 27.22 27.02 36.40 36.17 45.66 45.33 54.71 54.60
0.7 8.47 8.47 16.27 16.05 24.98 24.26 33.46 32.82 41.94 41.62
0.9 1.48 1.48 8.31 7.00 15.59 14.01 23.01 21.76 30.50 29.99
1.1 - - 3.46 0.97 8.71 5.82 14.50 12.28 20.50 19.61
1.3 - - 1.12 - 4.15 0.60 7.90 4.82 12.03 10.86
Proﬁt 0.5 67.3% 67.3% 90.7% 83.1% 121.3% 111.3% 140.5% 139.5% 156.3% 156.0%
Margin 0.7 26.9% 26.9% 51.7% 45.9% 71.4% 63.0% 86.9% 78.1% 99.9% 99.1%
0.9 6.6% 6.6% 30.8% 19.4% 43.3% 34.6% 56.8% 48.4% 61.6% 60.6%
1.1 - - 21.0% 4.4% 26.4% 15.1% 33.0% 24.8% 41.4% 35.7%
1.3 - - 8.6% - 16.0% 3.1% 20.3% 12.4% 23.1% 20.9%
Table 2: Numerical results. Optimal fleet sizes, profit per unit time, and profit margins for the
optimal (OPT) and complete sharing (CS) policies. In all test cases, the following parameters
are fixed: â1 = 10, â2 = 5, µ1 = µ2 = 1, λ1 + λ2 = 10. The relative value of the holding cost, hâ2 ,
and the fraction of demand due to the ‘preferred’ class, λ1λ1+λ2 , are systematically varied.
a rare enough event that it does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect optimal ﬂeet size (or, for that matter,
proﬁts).
The second is the fact that, when capacity costs are relatively low, complete sharing appears to
be fairly robust with respect to average proﬁt per unit of time. In particular, when h/â2 = 0.5, the
proﬁt advantage derived from capacity rationing is minimal, less than 1%, and when h/â2 = 0.7,
the advantage is no more than 3%. Here, increased costs, due to additional capacity, are made
up for by increased revenues, due to additional class-2 traﬃc. Rather, it is when capacity costs
are high – as high as or higher than class-2 penalty-adjusted revenues – that the proﬁt increase
due to restrictions on class-2 access become signiﬁcant.
The last eﬀect is that, conversely, capacity rationing provides for a more consistently signif-
icant increase in proﬁt margins over complete sharing. For example, even when capacity costs
are half that of penalty-adjusted class-2 revenues, margins may increase by as much as 9%. As
capacity costs approach and exceed class-2 fees, the beneﬁt that follows the ability to limit class-2
customers increases far more sharply.
Of dollar proﬁt and proﬁt margin, which is more indicative of the value of rationing to the
rental company? For capital-constrained companies, we would argue it is the latter. Indeed,
in many rental business, capacity is a signiﬁcant capital investment, and measures, such as
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return on assets, that track the (dollar) eﬃciency of asset utilization become critical measures
of performance for managers and for investors. In our numerical experiments, h – the cost per
unit of capacity per unit of time – reﬂects interest expenses of capacity investment (as well as
maintenance expenses). In dividing proﬁt by h · c (or, equivalently for us, by c) proﬁt margin
accounts for this investment in capacity.
Thus, absolute proﬁts lost, due to lack of control, may not be large. Nevertheless, the ability
to ration capacity and, in turn, to adjust the size of a rental ﬂeet can, at the same time, lead
to a signiﬁcant improvement in the economic utilization of the assets employed. The complete
sharing policy maximizes physical – rather than economic – utilization of assets. When complete
sharing is optimal, the two notions naturally coincide. When it is not optimal, however, it leads
to lower economic productivity.
5 Discussion
Our formulation of the rental capacity allocation problem captures some essential features that
the more traditional yield management literature does not address. In it, we explicitly represent
the fact that customers arrive at random, use pieces of equipment for rental periods of uncertain
duration, and then return the equipment to be used again.
Using dynamic programming techniques, we are able to characterize “switching curve” poli-
cies as being optimal. We also demonstrate that there are two sets of conditions under which a
customer class should be labeled a “VIP” and have unrestricted access to the available service
capacity: one in which there is ample excess capacity and another in which the penalty-adjusted
revenue and service rate parameters are favorable. In particular, we ﬁnd that customers may be
assigned the VIP tag even when their rental fees are lower than those of the other class.
When applied to both customer classes, the suﬃcient conditions for VIP status become
conditions in which “complete sharing” policies are optimal. These policies are of interest, since
service companies often use equipment utilization as a criterion for measuring system performance
and may be reluctant to turn away customers. Theorem 4 implies that the goals of maximizing
utilization and of maximizing revenues are properly aligned, even in the peak season, if the
penalty-adjusted rental fees and service rates of the diﬀerent customer classes are similar.
We also analyze a “ﬂuid aggregate threshold” (FAT) policy that is based on a ﬂuid approxi-
mation of the original policy. Our numerical tests show that the performance of the FAT heuristic
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is close to that of the optimal admission policies over a broad range of operating regimes. In
addition to providing a simple and eﬀective capacity allocation policy, the ﬂuid model results in
revenue which is a concave function of the rental ﬂeet size. This concavity is essential for the
analysis of related capacity sizing decisions and for an understanding of how capacity allocation
schemes aﬀect them.
We then demonstrate that, given this concavity property, the optimal ﬂeet size using capacity
rationing may be either higher or lower than that under the complete sharing policy. As capacity
costs grow, the optimal ﬂeet size under rationing grows relative to that under complete sharing.
Finally, we show that, appropriate adjustment of the ﬂeet size under complete sharing may
produce nearly optimal proﬁts. Even in this case, however, the economic productivity of assets
can suﬀer signiﬁcantly. When complete sharing is not optimal, its maximization of physical
utilization leads to economic underutilization of resources.
Thus, the formulation and results represent a promising step in furthering the understanding
of the management of rental systems. Of course, more work remains to be done. There are
several aspects of the allocation problem itself that merit additional analysis.
First, as we noted in Section 2, rental companies may have prior estimates of the expected
duration of the rental period, and this information would be of value when deciding whether
to admit a customer to the system. At the same time, the use of this information will also
signiﬁcantly complicate the analysis. For example, it will likely require expanding the state
space of the system from numbers of pieces of equipment in use to estimates of the duration of
the remaining rental period for every piece of equipment.
Similarly, our description of rental dynamics does not include the treatment of reservation
systems, which may provide additional information about rental demand. Again, the inclusion of
reservation systems should help to improve system performance, and it will also add an additional
layer of complexity to the analysis.
One may also consider price, in addition to capacity allocation, as a mechanism for control. In
particular, an interesting case exists in which one class of customers represents national accounts,
whose prices are ﬁxed by long-term contracts, while the other represents “rack rate” customers
for whom price may be used as a short-term control. Then the rental company may use capacity
allocation to maintain service levels for national-account clients at the same time it uses prices
to maximize proﬁts from rack-rate customers.
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The relationship between capacity allocation and ﬂeet sizing can also be explored over a longer
time horizon. For example, consider a longer-term, discrete-time problem in which each period
represents a season. At the start of each season, rental capacity is adjusted by buying and selling
units, and during the season tactical controls, such as the ones developed in this paper, are used
to manage short-term capacity shortages. Then if the season’s expected revenues are concave
in the ﬂeet size, it is not diﬃcult to show that the optimal ﬂeet-sizing policy is a “buy-up-to
/ sell-down-to” policy that is an analogue of “order-up-to” policies in the inventory literature
(Heyman and Sobel (1984)).
Finally, we recall that our formulation uses lump-sum penalty costs to capture the long-term
cost of denying access to customers. An alternative would be to impose service-level constraints
on the blocking probabilities of arrivals. While we believe that the current policies should be
“nearly” feasible, particularly for large systems, a thorough analysis of the relationship between
the two formulations would be of broad interest.
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Appendix
A Relationship Between Penalties and Service-Level Constraints
It may be the case that some part or all of the rejection penalties, (π1, π2), represents money that
the rental company pays to customers that it cannot accommodate. Our primary motivation for
their inclusion, however, is as “good will” costs.
An alternative approach would be to impose service-level constraints on the blocking prob-
abilities of the two classes. If one dualizes the constraints then the optimal solution to the
Lagrangian relaxation yields an objective value that equals that of the original, constrained
problem. In this case, lump-sum rejection costs naturally emerge as the problem’s Lagrange
multipliers, and they capture the value of the service-level constraints (see Chapters 3 and 4 in
Altman (1999)).
Well-known results concerning this type of constrained MDP show that the inclusion of
service-level constraints causes the optimal policy to randomize its actions in at most two of
its states, one for each constraint. Thus, the form of the optimal policy changes from that
for an analogous unconstrained problem, for which deterministic policies are optimal (see Ross
(1989) and Altman (1999)). In turn, because the optimal policy for the Lagrangian relaxation
is deterministic, it may not be feasible for the constrained problem.
At the same time, there is a common class of problems in which an optimal policy for the
Lagrangian relaxation can be shown to be feasible for the original problem with constraints. In
particular, when only one of the constraints is binding – for example, when one of the classes
represents “casual” or “rack rate” customers whose long-run arrival rate is not aﬀected by in-
cidences of blocking – the optimal policy for the constrained problem randomizes between two
stationary, deterministic policies, each of which is optimal for the Lagrangian relaxation. One of
the policies is feasible for the constrained problem but is not tight on the service-level constraint.
The other is not feasible but obtains a higher objective value. By randomizing between these
two policies, the optimal constrained policy improves upon the feasible policy and eliminates the
slack on the service-level constraint.
Furthermore, the actions of these two policies are identical in all states but one (see Sennott
(2001)). Thus, when only one of the original service-level constraints is binding, optimal policies
for the relaxation are known to be nearly identical to optimal policies with constraints. When
both constraints are binding, the theory breaks down, however.
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Therefore, rather than deﬁning service-level constraints, we deﬁne analogous dual prices, the
lump-sum rejection penalties $π1 and $π2. This formulation allows us to maintain the analytical
tractability of the problem. Furthermore, in Section 2.2 we demonstrate that the relaxation can
be further simpliﬁed by directly embedding Lagrange multipliers within the rental revenues, $a1
and $a2.
B Formal Deﬁnition of the MDPs
We formally deﬁne the discounted and average-cost formulations of the allocation problem’s
MDP. In both cases, we also sketch out why there exist stationary, deterministic policies that
are optimal.
We deﬁne the system state {Sˆt | t = 0, 1, . . .} that evolves at these event epochs as Sˆt =
(kˆt1, kˆ
t
2, gˆ
t
1, gˆ
t
2). Here, kˆ
t
i represents the number of type-i customers currently renting equipment.
Clearly 0 ≤ kˆt1, kˆt2 ≤ c, and 0 ≤ kˆt1 + kˆt2 ≤ c as well. We let gˆti ∈ {0, 1} equal 1 when the event is
an arrival of a class-i customer and 0 otherwise.
Note that Sˆt represents the before action state of the system at event epoch t. Alternatively,
we may record the system state at transition t after action, after the system manager has decided
to accept or reject an arriving customer, if one exists. We deﬁne this after action state space
St = (kt1, k
t
2) to be the numbers of units being rented after the t
th decision epoch.
To analyze the discrete-time process embedded at event epochs, we uniformize the underlying
continuous time Markov chain to evolve at constant rate Γ = λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c. Then if the
after-action state at epoch t is St = (kt1, k
t
2), we have the following set of transition probabilities
Sˆt+1 =

(kt1, k
t
2, 1, 0) w.p. λ1 / Γ,
(kt1, k
t
2, 0, 1) w.p. λ2 / Γ,
(kt1 − 1, kt2, 0, 0) w.p. µ1kt1 / Γ,
(kt1, k
t
2 − 1, 0, 0) w.p. µ2kt2 / Γ,
(kt1, k
t
2, 0, 0) w.p.
(
µ1
(
c− kt1
)
+ µ2
(
c− kt2
))
/ Γ .
(35)
Note that departures that drive the system occupancy to be negative occur with probability zero
and that the last transition probability reﬂects uniformization at rate Γ.
Let ut ∈ {0, 1} denote the action taken at event epoch t. If the action is to accept an arriving
customer, then ut = 1, and if the action is to reject an arriving customer, then ut = 0. At event
epochs that represent customer departures we let ut = 0 as well.
A policy ∆ is a set of decision rules used by the system controller when choosing whether to
accept or reject an arrival at each epoch t. Deﬁne the history of the system up to event epoch
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t to be the Ht = {(Sˆ0, u0), . . . , (Sˆt−1, ut−1) ∪ Sˆt}, the record of all states and actions taken up
through event epoch t. A non-anticipating policy ∆ is a rule which chooses an action ut, possibly
at random, using only the information available in Ht. We consider only such non-anticipating
rules, and we denote the action taken at t under ∆ as u∆t . Finally, a stationary policy considers
only the current state Sˆt when determining ut.
Our analysis of capacity allocation rules primarily considers the maximization of expected
discounted proﬁts over an inﬁnite horizon, and the formal results of this section are stated in
this context. Let α > 0 be the continuous-time discount rate. We can always select time units
so that Γ + α = 1. Then, we seek a non-anticipating policy ∆ to maximize
lim
t→∞
t∑
s=0
αs E∆[a1 (kˆs1 + gˆ
s
1u
∆
s ) + a2(kˆ
s
2 + gˆ
s
2u
∆
s ) − (π1 gˆs1 + π2gˆs2) (1− u∆s )]. (36)
The fact that the state and action spaces are ﬁnite, one-period rewards and costs are station-
ary and bounded, and α < 1 implies that the maximum in (36) is achieved and that there exists
a stationary, deterministic policy that is optimal (see Chapter 6 in Puterman (1994)). In turn,
this implies that we may restrict our attention to this class of policies.
We also consider the maximization of average proﬁt per period, often referred to as the
“average cost” criterion. In particular, numerical comparisons are more transparent in this
context, since average proﬁts per period do not depend on an initial state, and all of the numerical
results in the paper are stated in the context of average-cost problems.
In the average-cost formulation, we deﬁne the time scale so that Γ = λ1 +λ2 + cµ1 + cµ2 = 1
and the expected one-period revenue earned from renting a unit to a class-i customer is ai ≡ aiΓ .
In turn, we seek a policy ∆ to maximize
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=0
E∆
[
a1 (kˆs1 + gˆ
s
1u
∆
s ) + a2 (kˆ
2
s + gˆ
s
2u
∆
s ) − (π1 gˆs1 + π2gˆs2) (1− u∆s )
]
. (37)
In this case we can also restrict our analysis to that of stationary, deterministic policies.
Note that, for any stationary policy, the before-action state (0, 0, 0, 0) is positive recurrent.
Furthermore, under any such policy, state (0, 0, 0, 0) is accessible from all other states. Together,
these facts imply that, for any stationary policy, each state that is accessible from (0, 0, 0, 0) is
positive recurrent and each state that is not is transient. Thus, each stationary, deterministic
policy induces a single class of recurrent states, so that the resulting problem is unichain. In
addition, the system is aperiodic, since the last transition of (35) implies that with positive
probability the system remains in the current state after one transition. Together with the
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ﬁniteness of the state and action spaces and the stationary, bounded nature of costs and rewards,
these conditions imply that the maximum in (37) is achieved and that there exists a stationary,
deterministic policy that is optimal (see Chapter 8 in Puterman (1994)).
C Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Let v̂(k1, k2) be a solution to the adjusted value function:
v̂(k1, k2) = â1k1 + â2k2 + λ1Ĥ1[v(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[v(k1, k2)]
+ µ1k1v̂(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2v̂(k1, k2 − 1)
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)v̂(k1, k2) (38)
where âi = ai + πi (µi + α), as in (7).
Ĥ1[f(k1, k2)] =
{
max[f(k1, k2), f(k1 + 1, k2)] when k1 + k2 < c,
f(k1, k2) when k1 + k2 = c,
(39)
Ĥ2[f(k1, k2)] =
{
max[f(k1, k2), f(k1, k2 + 1)] when k1 + k2 < c,
f(k1, k2) when k1 + k2 = c.
(40)
Then using (8) to substitute for v(k1, k2) we observe that
H1[v(k1, k2)] = H1[v̂(k1, k2)−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1k1 − π2k2]
= −
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1(k1 + 1)− π2k2 + Ĥ1[v̂(k1, k2)]. (41)
Similarly,
H2[v(k1, k2)] = −
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1k1 − π2(k2 + 1) + Ĥ2[v̂(k1, k2)]. (42)
Again, using (8) to substitute into the optimality equation for v(k1, k2), we obtain
v̂(k1, k2)−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1k1 − π2k2
= a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1Ĥ1[v̂(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[v̂(k1, k2)]
+λ1
(
−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1(k1 + 1)− π2k2
)
+λ2
(
−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1k1 − π2(k2 + 1)
)
+µ1k1(v̂(k1 − 1, k2)−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1(k1 − 1)− π2k2)
+µ2k2(v̂(k1, k2 − 1)−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1k1 − π2(k2 − 1))
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+((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)(v̂(k1, k2)−
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
)
− π1k1 − π2k2)
= a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1Ĥ1[v̂(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[v̂(k1, k2)]
+µ1k1v̂(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2v̂(k1, k2 − 1)
+((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)v̂(k1, k2)
−(λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c)
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
+ π1k1 + π2k2
)
−λ1π1 − λ2π2 + µ1π1k1 + µ2π2k2, (43)
Transferring − (λ1 π1α + λ2 π2α )− π1k1 − π2k2 to the right-hand side of (43), we obtain
v̂(k1, k2) = a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1Ĥ1[v̂(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[v̂(k1, k2)]
+µ1k1v̂(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2v̂(k1, k2 − 1)
+((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)v̂(k1, k2)
(1− (λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c))
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
+ π1k1 + π2k2
)
−λ1π1 − λ2π2 + µ1π1k1 + µ2π2k2
= a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1Ĥ1[v̂(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[v̂(k1, k2)]
+µ1k1v̂(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2v̂(k1, k2 − 1)
+((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)v̂(k1, k2)
+α
(
λ1
π1
α
+ λ2
π2
α
+ π1k1 + π2k2
)
−λ1π1 − λ2π2 + µ1π1k1 + µ2π2k2 . (44)
Algebraic manipulation of (44) then yields
v̂(k1, k2) = (a1 + π1 (α + µ1)) k1 + (a2 + π2 (α + µ2)) k2
+λ1Ĥ1[v̂(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[v̂(k1, k2)]
+µ1k1v̂(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2v̂(k1, k2 − 1) + ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)v̂(k1, k2). (45)
Finally, a comparison of (2)–(3) (with f ≡ v) with (39)–(40) (with f ≡ vˆ) shows that a policy
optimally accepts a customer in the original problem if and only if it accepts a customer in the
transformed problem. 
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The Adjusted Value Iteration Formulation for the Average Cost Case
First, we deﬁne value iteration for the average cost case. As in (37) we select time units so that
Γ = λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c = 1. Here, the result of the nth trial of the procedure can be expressed
as
Vn(k1, k2) = a1k1 + a2k2 + λ1H1[Vn−1(k1, k2)] + λ2H2[Vn−1(k1, k2)]
+ µ1k1Vn−1(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2Vn−1(k1, k2 − 1)
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)Vn−1(k1, k2) , (46)
where the Hi’s are deﬁned as in (2)–(3).
In this case, the same type of convergence to a value function holds, though both the necessary
conditions and the statement of the result are a bit more delicate. In particular, we note that
the system has ﬁnite state and action spaces and is unichain and aperiodic. Therefore, there
exists an optimal policy that is stationary and deterministic, with average revenue per period V
(the “gain”). Furthermore, limn→∞ Vn(k1, k2)/n = V (see Chapter 8 in Puterman (1994)).
Similarly, we prove the average-cost analogue of Theorem 1 by analyzing the value iteration
operator, rather than the value function. Formally, we state the result as follows:
Theorem A1
For any average cost problem, with (a1, a2, π1, π2) for which limn→∞ Vn(k1, k2)/n = V , there
exists an alternative formulation, with rewards âi = ai + µiπi, i = 1, 2 and zero penalties, for
which limn→∞ V̂n(k1, k2)/n = V̂ and
V̂ = V + λ1π1 + λ2π2. (47)
Proof We let the adjusted value iteration operator T be
V̂n+1(k1, k2) = â1k1 + â2k2 + λ1Ĥ1[V̂n(k1, k2)] + λ2Ĥ2[V̂n(k1, k2)]
+ µ1k1V̂n(k1 − 1, k2) + µ2k2V̂n(k1, k2 − 1)
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)V̂n(k1, k2) , (48)
where âi = ai + πi µi is the expected adjusted class i revenue per period, and
Ĥ1[f(k1, k2)] =
{
max[f(k1, k2), f(k1 + 1, k2)] when k1 + k2 < c,
f(k1, k2) when k1 + k2 = c,
(49)
Ĥ2[f(k1, k2)] =
{
max[f(k1, k2), f(k1, k2 + 1)] when k1 + k2 < c,
f(k1, k2) when k1 + k2 = c.
(50)
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Given V0 = 0, and V̂0 ≡ π1k1 + π2k2, we will prove by induction that the relationship
V̂n(k1, k2) = Vn(k1, k2) + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1k1 + π2k2 (51)
holds for all n. Then Vn + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) ≤ V̂n ≤ Vn + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + µ1π1c + µ2π2c for all
n, and limn→∞ V̂n/n = V + λ1π1 + λ2π2.
Using (51) to substitute for Vn(k1, k2) in H1, we observe that
H1[Vn(k1, k2)] = H1[V̂n(k1, k2)− (n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1k1 + π2k2)]
= −n(λ1π1 + λ2π2)− π1(k1 + 1)− π2k2 + Ĥ1[V̂n(k1, k2)]. (52)
Similarly,
H2[Vn(k1, k2)] = −n(λ1π1 + λ2π2)− π1k1 − π2(k2 + 1) + Ĥ2[V̂n(k1, k2)]. (53)
Substituting for aˆi, Ĥi, and V̂n on the right hand side of (48) we have
V̂n+1(k1, k2) = (a1 + µ1π1)k1 + (a2 + µ2π2)k2
+λ1H1[Vn(k1, k2) + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1(k1 + 1) + π2k2]
+λ2H2[Vn(k1, k2) + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1k1 + π2(k2 + 1)]
+µ1k1(Vn(k1 − 1, k2) + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1(k1 − 1) + π2k2)
+µ2k2(Vn(k1, k2 − 1) + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1k1 + π2(k2 − 1))
+((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2k2)(Vn(k1, k2) + n(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1k1 + π2k2).
Then collecting terms and using λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c = 1 we obtain
V̂n+1(k1, k2) = Vn+1(k1, k2) + (n + 1)(λ1π1 + λ2π2) + π1k1 + π2k2. (54)

Proof of Theorem 2
Please see Altman et al. (1998) or Savin (2001).
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof Below we prove (11) for i = 1, since the proof for i = 2 is trivially obtained from it.
By contradiction suppose that at time 0 there are k1 + k2 = c − 1 customers in the system and
that the optimal policy, π, rejects an arriving class-1 customer with service time t˜0 ∼ exp(µ1).
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Consider an alternative policy, π′, that accepts the class-1 customer at time 0. Furthermore,
suppose that π′ follows π as closely as possible thereafter: whenever π rejects a customer, so
does π′; whenever π accepts a customer, π′ attempts to accept the customer as well. The only
case in which π′ rejects a customer that π accepts is the one in which blocking occurs. This
blocking is due, ultimately, to the acceptance of the class-1 customer at time 0. Below we show
that the expected discounted revenue is greater under π′ than under π as long as the service
capacity is large enough.
Consider the possible states of the system under policies π and π′ on (0, t˜0), just before the
service completion of the customer accepted under π′ at time 0 (We will sometimes use π and π′
to denote systems themselves.) For simplicity, below we denote the number of class i customers
in the π system, kπi (t|(k1, k2)), as kπi (t), and the number of class i customers in the π
′
system,
kπ
′
i (t|(k1 + 1, k2)), as kπ
′
i (t). The following Lemma shows that for any t ∈ (0, t˜0), two systems
will vary by at most one customer.
Lemma A1
For all t ∈ (0, t˜0) all but one of the customers are identical in the two systems. i) The customer
admitted at time 0 to π′ does not appear in π. ii) There may be one fewer customer in π than
π′, or there may be one customer in π – of type 1 or type 2 – that does not appear in π′. iii)
This implies, 0 ≤ kπ′1 (t)− kπ1 (t) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ kπ2 (t)− kπ
′
2 (t) ≤ 1.
Proof We prove the lemma by induction. At time 0 π′ has one more customer, and this customer
is of type 1. The other c− 1 customers are identical in both systems.
Suppose ﬁrst that all but one customer are identical and an arrival occurs. If both systems
accept or reject the arrival, then the systems still diﬀer by at most one. If system π accepts the
arrival but system π′ does not, then there must have been c− 1 identical customers, and system
π′ was full because of the customer it accepted at time 0. Again the induction holds, this time
with c−1 identical customers and diﬀerent customers occupying the cth slot in the two systems.
Next, suppose all but one customer in both systems are identical and a departure occurs. If
one of the customers common to the two systems has left, the induction holds. Otherwise the
departure may be a customer that was admitted to system π but blocked from π′, in which case
all but the one remain identical, and π′ is left with one more customer than π, the customer
admitted at time 0. Finally, the departure may be that of the type-1 customer admitted to π′
at time zero, in which case the induction assumption holds and the stopping time t˜0 is attained.

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It follows directly from the lemma that at t˜0, just after the customer admitted to π′ at time
0 has left, the systems will be in one of the following three states:
A0 =
{
kπ1 (t˜0) = k
π′
1 (t˜0); k
π
2 (t˜0) = k
π′
2 (t˜0)
}
, (55)
A1 =
{
kπ1 (t˜0) = k
π′
1 (t˜0) + 1; k
π
2 (t˜0) = k
π′
2 (t˜0)
}
, or (56)
A2 =
{
kπ1 (t˜0) = k
π′
1 (t˜0); k
π
2 (t˜0) = k
π′
2 (t˜0) + 1
}
, (57)
where P{A0} + P{A1} + P{A2} = 1. We can also deﬁne the “blocking event” to be
B =
{
a customer arrival on (0, t˜0) is blocked under π′ but not π
}
.
After t˜0 policy π′ can exactly match the actions of π. Given event A1 or A2 occurs, at t˜0
π will have one more customer in the system than π′, however. Given A1 occurs, we deﬁne a
second random time, t˜1, to be the remaining service time, after t˜0, of the extra type-1 customer in
system π. Here t˜1 ∼ exp(µ1), independent of t˜0. Similarly, given A2 occurs, we deﬁne t˜2 to be the
remaining service time, after t˜0, of the extra type-2 customer in system π, where t˜2 ∼ exp(µ2).
Thus, for each of the three events, we can deﬁne a random time t˜ at which the system under
π′ couples with that under π: given A0 they couple at t˜ = t˜0; given A1 they couple at t˜ = t˜0+ t˜1;
and given A2 they couple at t˜ = t˜0 + t˜2. Furthermore, in each of these cases we can use Lemma
C to bound the diﬀerence in discounted revenues earned by the two systems until the coupling
time. When there is no blocking in either system, policy π′ earns a1 units of revenue more per
unit of time until t˜0, due to the extra type 1 customer taken at time 0. When there is blocking
in π′, however, system π may earn â1 or â2 units per unit of time until t˜, depending on the type
of customer blocked. A simple upper bound on the revenue lost would be a = max(â1, â2) for t˜
units of time. To prove the Theorem, we will use the bounds and stopping times to show that for
systems with large service capacities the expected discounted revenue until coupling is greater
under π′ than under π.
Let ∆+ be the extra discounted revenue earned on (0, t˜] in π′ from accepting the class-1
customer at time 0, let ∆− be the discounted revenue foregone in π′ due to blocking that might
occur, and let ∆ = ∆+ −∆− be the diﬀerence. Then,
E[∆] = E[∆+]− E[∆ ]
=
+∞∫
0
t∫
0
â1e
−αsdsdFt˜0
−
+∞∫
0
P
{
B|t˜0 = t
}
E
[
∆ |B ∩ t˜0 = t
]
dFt˜0 −
+∞∫
0
P
{
B|t˜0 = t
}
E
[
∆ |B ∩ t˜0 = t
]
dFt˜0
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≥
+∞∫
0
t∫
0
â1e
−αsdsdFt˜0
−
+∞∫
0
P
{
B|t˜0 = t
} t∫
0
ae−αsds + e−αt
+∞∫
0
a
α
(
1− e−αs)µe−µsds
 dFt˜0 (58)
where
{
B|t˜0 = t
}
conditions event B on event t˜0 = t, µ = min (µ1, µ2), the ﬁrst term in the
square brackets is an upper bound on the revenue lost on (0, t˜0), and the second term in the
square brackets is an upper bound on the revenue lost on (t˜0, t). In (58) we have also used the
fact that no revenue is lost if blocking event B does not occur. Substituting µ1e−µ1tdt for dFt˜0
and integrating, we have
E[∆] =
â1
µ1 + α
−
+∞∫
0
P
{
B|t˜0 = t
}[ a
α
(
1− e−αt)+ e−αt a
µ + α
]
µ1e
−µ1tdt. (59)
We plan to show that
+∞∫
0
e−(µ1+α)tP
{
B|t˜0 = t
}
dt ≤ λ1 + λ2
(λ1 + λ2 + (c− 2)µ) (µ1 + α)
(
2 +
λ + 2µ
µ1 + α
)
, (60)
and
+∞∫
0
(
1− e−αt) e−µ1tP {B|t˜0 = t} dt ≤ (λ1 + λ2)α(λ1 + λ2 + (c− 2)µ)µ21
(
6 + 4
(
λ + 2µ
µ1
))
(61)
or equivalently, that E[∆] ≥ 0 for c ≥ c∗1.
We cannot directly characterize P{B}, since we do not know the details of how π and π′
behave on (0, t˜0). Instead, we will develop an upper bound on P{B} by analyzing a simpler,
well-deﬁned system for which we prove that the probability of blocking is greater than that of
the original system. We derive the system in two steps.
First, consider the probability of blocking when the complete sharing (CS) policy, which
accepts all arriving customers as long as there is available capacity, and let PCS{B} be the
probability of blocking on (0, t˜0) when complete sharing policy is used. Then
Lemma A2
PCS{B|t˜0 = t} ≥ P{B|t˜0 = t}.
Proof We use a sample-path argument. Consider any sample path in which t˜0 = t and in which
blocking occurs on (0, t) under π
′
. In particular, consider the moment that blocking ﬁrst occurs
under π
′
. If blocking has already occurred under CS, then we are done. If blocking has not
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yet occurred, then under CS the system has at least as many customers as in π
′
, since CS has
rejected none of the customers accepted under π′, and blocking also occurs under CS at this
time. Therefore, whenever there is blocking under π′, there will be blocking under CS as well.

Second, we note that by conditioning on t˜0 = t, we eﬀectively reduce the size of the system
under consideration by one unit of capacity. That is,
PCS{B|t˜0 = t} = PCS{∃ blocking on (0, t) in a (c− 1) server system that is full at time 0}.
Because this probability is still diﬃcult to analyze, we consider the following three-state Markov
chain that is designed to allow us to characterize an upper bound on the probability:
M =
 1− p p 01− p 0 p
0 0 1
 ,
where λ = λ1 + λ2 and p = λ/(λ + (c− 2)µ¯).
Let TCS be the ﬁrst time blocking occurs in the (c− 1)-server system with complete sharing
and let TM be the ﬁrst time the Markov chain M passes to state 3, given it starts in state 2.
Then
Lemma A3
TCS ≥st TM , which implies PCS{B|t˜0 = t} ≤ PM{TM ≤ t}.
Proof (Sketch) First, compare the original (c−1)-server system under CS to another CS system
in which all customers in service have mean service time µ¯ = min(µ1, µ2), rather than the original
µ1 and µ2. By coupling the two sequences of service times, we can show that the probability
that the system with the slow services (both with mean µ¯) will experience blocking by time t is
greater than the probability that the original system does.
Next, consider the CS system with slow services, µ¯. The system starts out with c−1 customers
in service and experiences blocking on the ﬁrst transition with probability λ/(λ+(c−1)µ¯). If the
next event is a departure, however, there are c − 2 customers in the system, and the analogous
probability that the next event is an arrival (though not blocking) is higher, λ/(λ + (c− 2)µ¯).
Then, observe that the Markov chain M is constructed to mimic the c − 1 server system
as follows. 1) State 1 corresponds to c − 2 customers in service, state 2 corresponds to c − 1
customers in service, and a transition to state 3 corresponds to the blocking event in the (c− 1)-
server system. 2) The rate at which arrivals occur is the same in both M and the (c− 1)-server
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system. 3) The rate at which service completions occurs is less in system M than that in the
(c− 1)-server system. 4) The “occupancy” in M never drops below c− 2, which corresponds to
state 1.
Thus, if we start system M in state 2, then its ﬁrst passage time to state 3 is constructed
to be stochastically smaller than the time to blocking in system CS with service rates µ¯. In
particular, the sequence of arrivals that triggers the blocking event in CS can be coupled to that
in M. Similarly, the number of departures from system M up to the blocking event in CS is no
more than that in the CS system. The result follows. 
For Markov chain M we obtain
Lemma A4
+∞∫
0
e−(µ1+α)tPM (TM ≤ t)dt ≤ λ1 + λ2(λ1 + λ2 + (c− 2)µ) (µ1 + α)
(
2 +
λ + 2µ
µ1 + α
)
, (62)
and
+∞∫
0
(
1− e−αt) e−µ1tPM (TM ≤ t)dt ≤ (λ1 + λ2)α(λ1 + λ2 + (c− 2)µ)µ21
(
6 + 4
(
λ + 2µ
µ1
))
. (63)
Proof From the deﬁnition of TM we obtain
PM
(
TM ≤ t) = +∞∑
k=1
qkFE (k,Λ, t) , (64)
where FE (k,Λ, t) = 1− exp (−Λt)
k−1∑
i=0
(Λt)i
i! is the degree-k Erlang CDF, Λ = λ1 + λ2 + cµ, and
qk is the probability that the Markov chain M reaches state 3 in exactly k steps starting in state
2. We note that q1 = p, q2 = 0 and
qk = (1− p)pbk−2, k ≥ 3, (65)
where bk is the probability that M reaches state 2 in exactly k steps starting in state 1. This
last probability satisﬁes the recursion
bk = (1− p)bk−1 + p(1− p)bk−2, k ≥ 3, (66)
with initial conditions b1 = p, b2 = p(1− p). From (66) we obtain
A =
+∞∑
k=1
bkQ
k = pQ+ p(1− p)Q2 + (1− p)Q (A− pQ) + p(1− p)Q2A, (67)
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for any Q < 1, so that
+∞∑
k=1
bkQ
k =
pQ
1− (1− p)(1 + pQ)Q. (68)
Then, from (64), (65) and (68), we obtain for any ω > 0
+∞∫
0
e−ωtPM
(
TM ≤ t) dt
=
1
ω
+∞∑
k=1
qk
(
Λ
ω + Λ
)k
=
1
ω
(
p
(
Λ
ω + Λ
)
+ p(1− p)
(
Λ
ω + Λ
)2 +∞∑
k=1
bk
(
Λ
ω + Λ
)k)
=
p
ω
(
Q (ω) +
p(1− p)Q3(ω)
1−Q(ω) + pQ(ω)− p(1− p)Q2(ω)
)
≤ p
ω
(
1 +
p
1−Q(ω)
)
≤ p
ω
(
1 +
λ
ω
(
λ + µ(c− 2) + ω + 2µ
λ + µ(c− 2)
))
≤ p
ω
(
2 +
λ + 2µ
ω
)
. (69)
where Q(ω) = Λ/ (ω + Λ) , Λ = λ1 + λ2 + cµ. Finally,
+∞∫
0
(
e−µ1t − e(α+µ1)t
)
PM
(
TM ≤ t) dt ≤ α +∞∫
0
te−µ1tPM
(
TM ≤ t) dt
= −α d
dω
[
p
ω
(
Q (ω) +
p(1− p)Q3(ω)
1−Q(ω) + pQ(ω)− p(1− p)Q2(ω)
)]
ω=µ1
= α
(
p
ω2
(
Q (ω) +
p(1− p)Q3(ω)
1−Q(ω) + pQ(ω)− p(1− p)Q2(ω)
))
ω=µ1
+α
(
pQ (ω)
ω2
(
1−Q (ω) + p(1− p)Q
2(ω)(1 −Q (ω))(3−Q (ω) (2 + pQ (ω))(1 − p))
(1−Q(ω) + pQ(ω)− p(1− p)Q2(ω))2
))
ω=µ1
≤ α p
µ21
(
2 + 4
(
p
1−Q(µ1)
))
≤ α p
µ21
(
6 + 4
(
λ + 2µ
µ1
))
. (70)

Now, (60) and (61) are obtained by combining results of Lemmas 2, 3 and 4. This completes
the theorem’s proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof Here we will prove (12) for i = 1, since the proof for i = 2 can be obtained from it by
the simple exchange of indices. Consider the class of functions F ∗ deﬁned on the set S such that
each member of this class f(k1, k2) is a submodular function satisfying the following relations:
f(k1, k2)− f(k1 + 1, k2) ≤ 0, k1 + k2 = c− 1, (71)
f(k1 + 1, k2)− f(k1, k2) ≤ â1
µ1
, k1 + k2 + 1 ≤ c, and (72)
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f(k1, k2 + 1)− f(k1 + 1, k2) ≤ â1
λ2
, k1 + k2 + 1 ≤ c. (73)
Because of the submodularity of f(k1, k2), the (71) is, in fact, valid for every pair (k1, k2) ∈ S.
Below we show that F ∗ is closed under T if the condition (12) is satisﬁed. Indeed, using the
expected discounted proﬁt optimality equation for the k1 + k2 + 1 = c, we obtain
Tf(k1, k2) − Tf(k1 + 1, k2)
= −â1 + λ2(max[f(k1, k2), f(k1, k2 + 1)]− f(k1 + 1, k2))
+µ1k1(f(k1 − 1, k2)− f(k1, k2))
+µ2k2(f(k1, k2 − 1)− f(k1 + 1, k2 − 1))
+((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1(k1 + 1)− µ2k2)(f(k1, k2)− f(k1 + 1, k2))
≤ 0. (74)
Also, for any (k1, k2) ∈ S such that k1 + k2 + 1 < c, we have
Tf(k1 + 1, k2) − Tf(k1, k2)
= a1 + λ1(f(k1 + 2, k2)− f(k1 + 1, k2))
+ λ2(max[f(k1 + 1, k2), f(k1 + 1, k2 + 1)]−max[f(k1, k2), f(k1, k2 + 1)])
+ µ1k1(f(k1, k2)− f(k1 − 1, k2)) + µ2k2(f(k1 + 1, k2 − 1)− f(k1, k2 − 1))
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1(k1 + 1)− µ2k2)(f(k1 + 1, k2)− f(k1, k2))
≤ (λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c)a1
µ1
≤ a1
µ1
. (75)
For the case k1 + k2 + 1 = c we obtain
Tf(k1 + 1, k2) − Tf(k1, k2)
= â1 + λ2(f(k1 + 1, k2)−max[f(k1, k2), f(k1, k2 + 1)])
+ µ1k1(f(k1, k2)− f(k1 − 1, k2))
+ µ2k2(f(k1 + 1, k2 − 1)− f(k1, k2 − 1))
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1(k1 + 1)− µ2k2)(f(k1 + 1, k2)− f(k1, k2))
≤ â1
µ1
. (76)
Further, considering Tf(k1, k2 + 1)− Tf(k1 + 1, k2) for the case k1 + k2 + 1 < c, we obtain
Tf(k1, k2 + 1) − Tf(k1 + 1, k2)
= â2 − â1 + λ1(f(k1 + 1, k2 + 1)− f(k1 + 2, k2))
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+ λ2(max[f(k1, k2 + 1), f(k1, k2 + 2)] −max[f(k1 + 1, k2), f(k1 + 1, k2 + 1)])
+ µ1k1(f(k1 − 1, k2 + 1)− f(k1, k2)) + µ2k2(f(k1, k2)− f(k1 + 1, k2 − 1))
+ ((µ1 + µ2)c− µ1k1 − µ2(k2 + 1))(f(k1, k2 + 1)− f(k1 + 1, k2))
+ (µ1 − µ2)(f(k1 + 1, k2)− f(k1, k2)). (77)
Now, if µ1 ≤ µ2, then
Tf(k1, k2 + 1)− Tf(k1 + 1, k2) ≤ â2 − â1 + (λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c) â1
λ2
− µ2 â1
λ2
≤ â1
λ2
(78)
whenever
â1 ≥ λ2
λ2 + µ1
â2. (79)
If, on the other hand, µ1 > µ2, then
Tf(k1, k2 + 1)− Tf(k1 + 1, k2) ≤ â2 − â1 + (λ1 + λ2 + (µ1 + µ2)c) â1
λ2
− µ2 â1
λ2
+ (µ1 − µ2) â1
µ1
≤ â1
λ2
(80)
for
â1
µ1
≥ λ2
λ2 + µ1
â2
µ2
. (81)
The proof for the case when k1 + k2 + 1 = c is easily obtained from the above arguments. 
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof Here we consider the only non-trivial case of case of ρ1 ≥ c, so that kFAT < c is optimal.
Suppose the initial state is k = 0. Then diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to kFAT, we obtain
∂RFATα (k,kFAT)
∂kFAT
=
(ρ1 + ρ2 − kFAT)
α
µ
−1
(µ + α) (ρ1 + ρ2 − k)
α
µ
×
((
â2ρ2 +
â1 (ρ1 − c)
α
µ
+1
(ρ1 − kFAT)
α
µ
)
− (ρ1 + ρ2 − kFAT)
(
â1 (ρ1 − c)
α
µ
+1
(ρ1 − kFAT)
α
µ
+1
))
=
ρ2 (ρ1 + ρ2 − kFAT)
α
µ
−1
(µ + α) (ρ1 + ρ2 − k)
α
µ
(
â2 − â1
(
ρ1 − c
ρ1 − kFAT
)α+µ
µ
)
. (82)
In turn, solving the ﬁrst order conditions, ∂R
FAT
α (k,kFAT)
∂kFAT
= 0, for kFAT, provides
k∗ = c− (ρ1 − c)
((
â1
â2
) µ
µ+α
− 1
)
.
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Furthermore, from (82) it can be seen that ∂R
FAT
α (k,kFAT)
∂kFAT
< 0 for all kFAT > k∗ and
∂RFATα (k,kFAT)
∂kFAT
>
0 for all kFAT < k∗. Thus for k = 0 the optimal threshold k∗FAT = k
∗ if and only if ρ1
(
1−
(
â2
â1
) µ
µ+α
)
≤
c < ρ1. For c below this range, k∗FAT = 0 is optimal.
We also claim that the optimal threshold, k∗FAT, is independent of the starting state, k, so
that the argument above, stated for k = 0, holds for all k ∈ [0, c]. Fist, note that the expression
for k∗ is independent of k. Thus, for all k < k∗FAT the diﬀerentiation by which k
∗ was obtained
is well-deﬁned and k∗FAT is optimal.
For k ≥ k∗FAT we prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose there exists a starting state
k1 > k
∗
FAT with optimal threshold k
1
FAT 	= k∗FAT. If k1FAT < k1 then, without loss of generality, we
can redeﬁne k1FAT to be k
∗
FAT, since from (24) we see that whenever k > kFAT discounted revenues
do not depend on kFAT. Otherwise k1 < k1FAT and, given the optimality of k
1
FAT, the following non-
threshold policy earns higher discounted revenues than the optimal k∗FAT threshold policy: when
k(t) ∈ [0, k∗FAT], accept both class-1 and class-2 customers; then when k(t) ∈ [k∗FAT, k1], accept
only class-1 customers; then when k(t) ∈ [k1, k1FAT], accept both class-1 and class-2 customers;
then when k(t) ∈ [k1FAT, c], accept only class-1 customers; ﬁnally, after k(t) hits c, process
according to the FAT policy. But if this non-threshold policy earns higher discounted revenues
than a FAT policy with threshold k∗FAT, then a FAT policy with threshold k
∗
FAT + (k
1
FAT − k1)
would also earn higher discounted revenues, and this contradicts the optimality of the k∗FAT policy
for k = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof Here we focus on proving part b), since (32) is obtained by substituting (31) into (23) and
(24). Consider 0 < k ≤ cmin. By taking ﬁrst and second derivatives of (32) with respect to c for
any k ≤ c, we observe that the optimal ﬂuid revenue function is an increasing piecewise concave
function of c; that is, it is concave in each of the intervals k ≤ c < cmin, cmin ≤ c < ρ1, ρ1 ≤ c <
ρ1 + ρ2, ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ c. In addition, ∂R
FAT
α (k,k
∗
FAT(c))
∂c (c = cmin − 0) ≥
∂RFATα (k,k
∗
FAT(c))
∂c (c = cmin + 0),
∂RFATα (k,k
∗
FAT(c))
∂c (c = ρ1 − 0) ≥
∂RFATα (k,k
∗
FAT(c))
∂c (c = ρ1 + 0),
∂RFATα (k,k
∗
FAT(c))
∂c (c = ρ1 + ρ2 − 0)
≥ ∂RFATα (k,k∗FAT(c))∂c (c = ρ1 + ρ2 + 0), which ensures overall concavity. In exactly the same way,
monotonicity and concavity of (32) with respect to c ≥ k is demonstrated for cmin < k ≤ ρ1,
ρ1 < k ≤ ρ1 + ρ2, ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ k. 
Proof of Theorem 7
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Proof It is well known that, under complete sharing, the average revenue per period is increasing
and concave in the ﬂeet size (see Messerli (1972)). Then statements a) and e) follow from the
deﬁnitions of h∗max and h∗min and from concavity of R (c,∆
∗(c)) and R (c,CS(c)) . From the
deﬁnitions of hCSmax and h∗max it follows that for the values of h between h∗max and hCSmax we
have c∗(h) ≥ 1 > cCS (h) = 0, and d) follows. Similarly, for h∗min < h < hCSmin, we have
cCS (h) ≥ c˜ > c˜ − 1 ≥ c∗(h), and we obtain b). Finally, c) follows from b) and d) and the
piecewise continuity of cCS(h) and c∗(h). 
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